

Financing Support for Child Reintegration

Issues and options study



GLOBAL COALITION
FOR REINTEGRATION OF CHILD SOLDIERS

Contents

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Preface

Children associated with armed forces and groups require long-term and sustained reintegration support. The recruitment and use of children in armed conflict is one of the most egregious violations of children’s rights, and the physical, emotional and cognitive growth of these children—and policies that support them to reach their full potential—are crucial to maximize their recovery and their families’ and communities’ futures. Supporting child reintegration is a strategic intervention for governments, donors and agencies towards the attainment of the Sustainable Development Goals and lasting prosperity and peace in conflict-affected countries.

Launched in September 2018, the Global Coalition for Reintegration of Child Soldiers—co-chaired

by the UN Special Representative for Children and Armed Conflict and the United Nations Children’s Fund—tasked its Expert Advisory Group to carry out research, interviews and a series of consultations¹ to develop three interrelated briefing papers to understand how the international community could more effectively support children who have exited armed forces and armed groups. This document is one of three papers and contains actionable recommendations to stimulate thinking and action to assist these most vulnerable children and their communities.² They explore the current status and issues surrounding funding for programming and general support, as well as options for more predictable and sustainable opportunities moving forward.



Acronyms

| | | | |
|--------|---|---------|---|
| CAAC | Children and Armed Conflict | PBF | United Nations Peacebuilding Fund |
| CAAFAG | Children Associated with Armed Forces or Armed Groups | PBSO | United Nations Peacebuilding Support Office |
| CERF | Central Emergency Response Fund | SDG | Sustainable Development Goal |
| CVR | Community Violence Reduction | SMEs | Small and Medium Enterprises |
| DAC | Development Assistance Committee (of the OECD) | SRSR | Special Representative of the Secretary-General |
| DDR | Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration | TDRP | Transitional Demobilization and Reintegration Program |
| DRR | Disaster Risk Reduction | ToR | Terms of Reference |
| ECHO | European Union Civil Protection and Humanitarian Aid Operations | UNDAF | United Nations Development Assistance Framework (now UNSDCF) |
| EDF | European Development Fund | UEPN | Unité d'Exécution du Programme National de Désarmement, Démobilisation et Réinsertion (DDR National Authority in the Democratic Republic Congo) |
| FCV | Fragility Conflict and Violence | UN OCHA | United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs |
| FTS | Financial Tracking System | UNSC | United Nations Security Council |
| GBS | General Budget Support | UNSDCF | United Nations Sustainable Development Cooperation Framework (previously UNDAF) |
| HDP-N | Humanitarian Development Peace Nexus | UNSG | United Nations Secretary-General |
| HRP | Humanitarian Response Plan | | |
| MDG | Millennium Development Goal | | |
| MDRP | Multi Country Demobilization and Reintegration Program | | |
| ODA | Official Development Assistance | | |
| OECD | Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development | | |



Executive Summary

In support of the Global Coalition for Reintegration of Child Soldiers, this paper aims to achieve a number of objectives:


- To map existing funding and financing flows for child reintegration (across the Humanitarian-Development-Peace Nexus)
- To identify and evaluate innovative funding and financing modalities
- To present options, benefits and drawbacks of funding and financing mechanisms and modalities for the future

After a brief summary of the rationale for financing and supporting child reintegration (Section 1), and drawing heavily on the findings of two other papers, Section 2 presents specific findings of relevance to financing modalities and their implications for reintegration. Specifically:

- A basic **typology of fragile contexts** is put forward and the implications for child reintegration programming in each of these contexts are considered.
- A number of **overarching principles** are considered in relation to the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness (2005). The Principles and Guidelines on Children Associated with Armed Forces or Armed Groups (2007) and

the Integrated Disarmament Demobilization and Reintegration Standards along with other frameworks such as Sustaining Peace.


- The section then provides a **detailed mapping and overview of resource flows** and current financing instruments grouped by channel (multilateral, bilateral, etc.), and their utility in terms of child reintegration is highlighted.
- The importance of **national ownership** and engagement on resourcing and financial instruments is highlighted and discussed.
- **Alternative and innovative financing instruments** are described and discussed.
- **Emerging issues** are highlighted and discussed, as illustrated here:



In Section 3, **key findings and recommendations** associated with the above are identified. These are

grouped and presented in the matrix below.

| Category | Key findings | Recommendations |
|------------------------|---|--|
| Understanding contexts | F1: Interventions and programs must be informed by a clear and thorough assessment that takes into account conflict dynamics and the wider political economy. If they are to result in success these processes must be multi-sectoral in nature and cover the HDP-N as a whole. It is also important that they proactively seek to engage with and include communities in a meaningful way and that they carefully consider and analyze risks, including those that might result from the intervention itself and the type of finding instrument used. | R1: Before final decisions are taken on the quantity and type of funding to be used a critical assessment must be made of the impact of the choice of instrument on the context and typology in which the intervention will be implemented. Issues related to the choice of intervention and partnerships go beyond financing instruments those providing financial support can play a major part in helping ensure that this takes place and that the financial modalities used are themselves fit for purpose. |
| Levels of funding | F2: Tracking actual levels of expenditure is extremely difficult in practice. Despite the presence of specific funding codes at OECD/DAC level, these do not always capture or describe the full extent or scope of activities. This is particularly the case given the increasing use of pooled or unearmarked funding and where local or national budgets are used. | R2: A more detailed analysis of 1-2 priority countries may help to get a more complete picture of the scale of overall funding deficits and to map out more clearly the challenges associated with transition of support across and between the HDP-N and typologies. R3: Global Coalition members may wish to host a discussion on this issue to identify which organization/s might be best placed to engage in dialogue with the OECD/DAC and others. The aim would be to see if further work is required to more closely track reintegration activities and expenditures without creating procedures which are too cumbersome or duplicative. Given their overall interest and mandate on reintegration as a whole, the Interagency Working Group on DDR should also be involved. |
| | F3: While there are overall deficits in resourcing these activities, not only the <i>volume</i> of resources must be considered, but also <i>bridging gaps</i> across the HDP-N and the <i>predictability</i> of funds to support child reintegration, given project and funding cycles. In some situations, the wrong choice of funding instruments, not just monetary shortfalls, may create problems if they give rise to undesirable incentives or tension between groups. | R4: Evidence that the impact of exposure to violence on child health, well-being, relationships and social interactions is acute, and the case for intervention is therefore paramount. However, there exists limited longitudinal evidence on what type of interventions are most effective in the long term. Establishing a research or Learning Agenda is likely to be of interest and importance on a range of issues related to all three briefing papers of the Global Coalition. |



| Category | Key findings | Recommendations |
|---|--|---|
| Strategic level funding instruments | <p>F4: Given the evidence of their potential to increase effectiveness and promote alignment among stakeholders, pooled funds are of growing importance. In terms of support for child reintegration in particular, if it can be more effectively brought onto the agenda and priorities of these instruments, it has the added advantage of building coherence and cooperation across the HDP-N at both global and national levels. Finding an appropriate response to the need to increase the volume and interconnectedness of support to child reintegration programs across the HDP-N is likely to require a mix of approaches as one size will certainly not fit all. Establishing and maintaining strategic coherence will be important.</p> | <p>R5: Further detailed design and costing work may be considered in relation to a number of potential options; (a) the development of a Global Multi-Country Child Reintegration Pooled Fund; (b) dialogue with the PBF/PBSO on whether opportunities exist for increasing support for child reintegration under one of more of their existing Priority Areas; and (c) as the new potential World Bank funding for reintegration is developed, options for this to include earmarked funds for child reintegration should be considered.</p> |
| Local/national level resourcing | <p>F5: Failure to properly consider local/national structures and systems (e.g. health services), particularly at sector level, are likely to make the creation of sustainable services much more challenging. In some situations, there may be a strong justification for structures to support individuals and groups for which it was not originally intended, but it is important that this is understood and explicitly documented with clear exit strategies established.</p> | <p>R6: Carefully consider the implications (financially and otherwise) of services and structures at all stages in the design and implementation process, with efforts made to merge services, where appropriate, into long-term plans and processes owned by national authorities. The sooner this begins, however nascent, the better. Early contributions from national Governments, however small, can be important signals of political commitment.</p> |
| Local ownership / supporting innovation | <p>F6: There is an increasing number of alternative mechanisms and approaches for providing support, particularly to and through local stakeholders. In the research so far, while they may exist, no specific examples of their use to support child reintegration has been found. However, there is both interest in and scope for the further development and piloting of these types of instruments and programs.</p> | <p>R7: The possibility of bringing together a group of private sector and public organizations (i.e. UN, NGOs, donors) and those with specific expertise in this area to develop and pilot alternative funding initiatives. Ideas might include the piloting of a challenge-fund-type approach to support child reintegration interventions or even the use of a Development/Humanitarian Bond to support training or SMEs for example.</p> |
| Coordination and coherence | <p>F7: Work undertaken to promote common analysis, joint objectives, measurable indicators and monitoring frameworks is a feature of some of the approaches to working in complex environments examined during this study. These are positive signs. It is also encouraging to note that in some of the recent country and strategic frameworks, real efforts were made to conduct detailed joint analysis and establish agreed objectives and monitoring frameworks. Finding ways to ensure that child reintegration is properly taken into account and included in these will be important now and in future.</p> | <p>R8: It is recommended to conduct a clear and broad analysis of the situation and role of the interventions needed for child reintegration to be effective. It must be clearly built into approval and appraisal procedures to ensure that interventions are underpinned by this analysis, and to determine where they fit within wider strategic frameworks and plans across the HDP-N. Notwithstanding, and taking into account conflict sensitivities, they should also be required to clearly demonstrate how and to what extent local authorities, communities and children themselves have been involved in assessment and design processes.</p> |



1. Introduction

1.1 Background

In September 2018, the UN Special Representative for Children and Armed Conflict and UNICEF, together with other key actors, launched the [Global Coalition for Reintegration of Child Soldiers](#) with the aim of bringing attention to and encouraging action to address and support sustainable child reintegration. This was, in part, in recognition of the fact that the reintegration of former child soldiers is a long but vital process, requiring extensive support from the international community and with the understanding that helping children deeply affected by conflict is an key component of building a peaceful future.

In pursuit of this aim, the Global Coalition conducted research, interviews and held a series of consultations with global academia, local and international NGOs, financing experts, UN/ international organizations and former child soldiers/children affected by armed conflict themselves to assess past successes and chart the way forward. A corollary aim was to innovate new ideas to enable all children formerly associated with armed forces and armed groups to access the short- and long-term services they need to fully reintegrate into society and contribute to a lasting and sustainable peace.

This consultative process was intended to contribute substantively to a series of three briefing papers to study and make recommendations on how to better address this strategic issue. The first was a paper re-framing support for child reintegration beyond just the humanitarian sphere, (2) a paper identifying the gaps and needs of child reintegration programming and funding, and (3) a paper outlining current financing support for child reintegration, including options to ensure significantly higher and more sustainable funding. This paper is the last in this series.

1.2 Study objectives

Three objectives were established for this paper. These are identified and briefly explored in the subsections below.

Objective A: Map existing funding flows

Financing for reintegration support comes from a host of sources in terms of both origin and type of funding instruments used. In this report, emphasis has been placed on identifying and mapping the types of funding instruments used in a number of different contexts across the Humanitarian-Development-Peace Nexus (HDP-N). Four

typologies of funding contexts is therefore put forward to assist in this analysis.

Given the diversity of ways in which reintegration activities and funding are described, precise mapping of the overall volume of funds is a significant challenge. However, overall trends have been explored in this paper, particularly in relation to certain countries or issues on the agenda of the Security Council and specifically reported on in the [Secretary-General's 2019 Report to the Security Council on Children in Armed Conflict](#).

As the [Reframing Reintegration](#) paper highlights, it is increasingly recognized that supporting the reintegration of children associated with armed forces and groups needs to go beyond the provision of often time-limited support to meet immediate humanitarian needs, but move towards a longer-term, sustained approach that bridges the HDP-N and contributes to the attainment of SDGs. Adopting this broader vision of child reintegration ensures that children receive a **continuum of care** that is not interrupted due to procedural deficiencies, and that interventions also contribute to strengthening the overarching protective environment for children that mitigates vulnerability and prevents further violations in the future.

This requires reflection on the role of external funding in child reintegration and the consideration of reintegration as a long-term process. This would include revisiting thinking on how external funding is used not only to support immediate reintegration needs, but also to assist establishing the necessary systems for local/national funding of reintegration elements and the systems and processes that underpin it.

Objective B: Identify and evaluate innovative financing modalities

In response to the challenges posed by complex contexts where conflict may be protracted, a number of funding modalities have been developed in recent years. The development of new approaches and instruments has also been led by the emergence of new private sector and philanthropic foundations that have wished to pursue new types of pooled funding. This paper attempts to identify and explore these in terms of their utility for supporting child reintegration and their potential for scale-up. It also seeks to examine and explore how mechanisms are used to access different types of actors and agencies, and issues related to their effectiveness and responsiveness in relation to this.

Objective C: Provide detailed options, including benefits and drawbacks of mechanisms or modalities

Building on the information identified in the objective above, the paper outlines five options for financing modalities moving forward. It takes into account the operating circumstances and conflict typologies under which programs might be seeking to raise and manage funds. The options explored include potential modifications and amendments to existing mechanisms. A corollary focus is the identification and mitigation of potential risks is also an important part of the development of financing mechanisms and instruments, especially in fragile contexts.

1.3 Context and rationale for financing reintegration

According to the Global Coalition's member War Child UK,³ dependable and predictable funding for child reintegration programming, particularly in emergency situations, has been steadily *decreasing*

in recent years, while needs are significantly *increasing*. The Global Coalition highlights a number of reasons why both the research into funding and financing, and the wider initiative to ensure the best possible support to former child soldiers, are important;

- In 2017 alone more than 10,000 children were released from armed groups in the Central African Republic, Colombia, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Myanmar, Nigeria, Somalia or South Sudan.
- In the past five years, UNICEF reports that it identified over 55,000 boys and girls who exited armed forces and armed groups globally, however only 70 percent (42,000) of these children could benefit from any type of reintegration activities.⁴ This number does not represent all children associated with armed groups or children who may have exited armed groups on their own during that period. It is estimated that the number of children leaving is probably much higher.
- Providing adequate, sustainable and reliably funded reintegration programs is essential to ensuring that child soldiers benefit from the necessary support to recover their lives and allow them to reintegrate into their communities.


UN Security Council Resolution 2427 (2018) and The Paris Principles and Guidelines on Children Associated with Armed Forces or Armed Groups (2007) state that reintegration programs need to be long-term and sustainable, must be gender- and age-sensitive, and must provide children with access to health care, psychosocial support and education.

In addition, a 2017 Ministerial-level Conference organized by France and UNICEF⁵ on Protecting Children from War specifically noted that,

“Participants recognized the need to considerably increase resources for children affected by armed conflict and their access to those resources, and to allow for predictable, consistent and long-term multi-sectoral finance for reintegration programs.”

There is a need to be able to respond to and support child reintegration in a sustainable manner across the HDP-N. It can be argued that providing more effective and sustainable reintegration opportunities for children associated with armed forces and groups is not only a **moral and legal obligation** but is a **strategic imperative** towards achieving better outcomes for children in terms of dealing with trauma, building and sustaining rights-based response frameworks, preventing re-recruitment of children into armed groups or criminal gangs, and avoiding stigmatization and further violence. Better outcomes for child reintegration, alongside other critical measures are important in helping to build sustainable peace and attaining the Sustainable Development Goals. A simple Theory of Change to achieve this is illustrated below.

Figure 1. Illustration of Theory of Change: Contribution of better outcomes for child reintegration to HDP-N



It is important that approaches to addressing the needs of children affected by armed conflict are holistic-sensitive to the needs of children associated with armed forces and groups but not limited to them—and it is critical that the needs of this cohort are recognized in multi-sector, multi-stakeholder action.

More effective responses to the needs of these children underpin broader efforts outlined in the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development and the Sustaining Peace Agenda:

- In relation to the **SDGs**, as the Reframing Paper highlights, many of the SDGs are relevant to the reintegration of child soldiers. These include **SDG 4**: Quality Education, **SDG 5**: Gender Equality, **SDG 8**: Decent Work and Economic Growth, and **SDG 16**: Peace, Justice and Strong Institutions. Target 8.7 refers explicitly to the need to eradicate the recruitment and use of children, while **Target 16.2** calls for an end to abuse, exploitation and all forms of violence against children.
- In the **Sustaining Peace Agenda**, the case is made for more predictable and sustained financing for civilian-led peacekeeping through a **Funding Compact** (see box), as one way to help reverse overall declines in development assistance to conflict-affected states as a share of global aid between 2005 and 2018.⁶

As an illustration of some of the challenges faced by these children, [Annex B](#) of this report is a table summarizing the issues and caseloads needing specific action or warranting specific attention in the Secretary-General's 2019 Report on Children and Armed Conflict. Although the report provides useful insights into the range of contexts and

Funding Compact

- The Funding Compact results from a series of in-depth Funding Dialogues between governments and the UN Sustainable Development Group. The Compact articulates concrete actions on both sides, by UN Member States and all the UN SDG entities, and contains a set of commitments each with relevant indicators to measure compliance.
- Through the Compact, Member States commit to bring core resources to a level of at least 30 percent in the next five years, increase the share of multi-year contributions, and double the levels of resources channeled through development-related inter-agency pooled funds and single agency thematic funds.
- [Final Draft of the Funding Compact](#) was circulated by the UN Secretary-General in March 2019.

challenges faced, it is important to note that the figures highlighted, in terms of the numbers of children, only account for **verified cases** and are considered to be merely indicative of the magnitude of the problem.

1.4 Method and approach

The methodology and approach used to gather and validate information is comprised of 4 parts: (a) Literature Review, (b) Stakeholder Mapping, (c) Primary Data gathering and (d) Validation. These processes are outlined and summarized in [Annex C](#).



2. Findings

2.1 Understanding operational contexts

There is a need to be able to respond to and support child reintegration in a more sustainable manner at different points and contexts across the HDP-N. Providing a continuity of support to children across conflict typologies, institutional mandates and project cycles across the HDP-N is very important.

While it must be recognized that each context and situation is unique, it is useful to put forward generic typologies to help identify and consider when and where different types of funding instruments could be used for maximum effectiveness. Table 1 attempts to take into account the complexity that exists in many of the contexts in which reintegration programming is or would be carried out, with an indication of the impact on programmatic responses in humanitarian, development and peacebuilding terms. Types and combinations of funding instruments in use are considered later in this section.

There should be a strong focus on capacity-building and conflict sensitivity across the typologies at both policy and program levels with national and local actors; including efforts to ensure the inclusion of marginalized groups in planning and decision-

making processes and equity in terms of resource allocation and programming.

In addition to the information highlighted above, a number of respondents interviewed for this paper said that there were additional factors that needed to be taken into account when it comes to financing reintegration activities:

- **The overall “visibility” or “attention” given to a conflict or humanitarian situation** by the international community. When situations are not high profile or are “off the radar” for a variety of reasons, financing interventions are more difficult. An example given by one respondent was the conflict in southern Cameroon where the relatively low visibility of the context has limited the resources available.
- **Whether or not a situation has a UN Mission** in place and the terms under which this operates may have significant implications for the types of programs that can be put in place and therefore funding instruments available. This may be particularly relevant in situations where UN peacekeepers are deployed, and wider DDR activities may be encouraged.⁷

Table 1. Basic typologies of fragile contexts with likely implications for child protection, reintegration and responses

| | Key features | HDP-N implications | Potential child protection reintegration issues/ responses |
|---|---|---|---|
| I. Total state collapse with widespread conflict and insecurity | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Large-scale active conflict with widespread and severe impacts on the civilian population and little/no access to all areas of the country. • Protracted humanitarian crisis with majority of population reliant on humanitarian service provision. Major disruption to livelihoods/ food production. • Little/no central Government authority and very little coordinated state provision of services. | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Large-scale humanitarian response likely to be required although securing and maintaining access likely to be a significant and ongoing challenge. • Despite major challenges, efforts to work with and through local mechanisms and help build and maintain their capacity and resilience should be maximized—some existing development programs/ activities could be re-oriented or used to assist. • Peacebuilding efforts likely to be focused on the promotion of dialogue within and between communities as appropriate and possible. | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Child protection concerns likely to be multiple and acute, including grave violations against children perpetrated by armed forces and groups—including need to help children leave armed groups, be protected from them and also counter risks of (re-)recruitment and provision of basic needs. • Children exiting armed forces and groups may require life-saving interventions including health care, family tracing and interim care. Important to support reentry into education and economic and social reintegration on a wider basis but situational constraints need to be recognized and realistically assessed. Support likely to be delivered mainly through NGOs or local Government with support, but must include consultation with beneficiaries and communities. |
| II. Severely conflict-affected | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • High levels of insecurity but with geographical areas of/or periods of stability. • Wide-scale humanitarian needs with significant proportion of population affected—but at least in some areas people able to pursue livelihoods/produce food. • Government/central authorities partially functional but likely to be weak in terms of capacity and possibly also state legitimacy—some service provision at national and/or local levels by regional or local service providers, i.e. local Government and/or NGOs. | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Large-scale humanitarian response likely to be required, although in some areas this may only need to be limited and mainly focused on supporting existing structures and services. • Activities and programs should help to strengthen and build local service delivery and structures—underpinned by careful and in-depth conflict analysis. • Peacebuilding efforts may include confidence-building measures and deepening dialogues and links across communities affected by conflict, including CVR programs. | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Ongoing need for support for those exiting armed groups, support to counter risks of re-/ recruitment and basic service provision. • Also need to establish support for reentry into education and economic and social reintegration and capacity building of local service providers. |

| | Key features | HDP-N implications | Potential child protection reintegration issues/ responses |
|------------------------------------|---|---|--|
| III. Highly fragile but functional | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Major risks of widespread conflict, and/or geographical areas with persistent high levels of insecurity. May be ongoing and significant humanitarian need in some areas, relative stability in others. Livelihoods and food production affected but can be pursued by most of the population. | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Humanitarian response and development programs should have a strong element of Disaster Risk Reduction (DRR) and planning and promote resilience of communities and sectors/services. This should include ensuring that policies and programs are conflict sensitive. Peacebuilding programming should be underpinning efforts to promote stability and equitable access to participation and services and may include efforts to do this through specific sector responses. Potential child protection and reintegration issues and responses. | <p>Ongoing need for support for children leaving armed groups where required—but also to put in place prevention and monitoring activities and community resilience activities. Support for reintegration activities as appropriate but service provision increasingly managed by and through national and local structures and within sector policies and guidelines—capacity building support.</p> |
| IV. At risk | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Countries in this category may be emerging from acute or protracted conflict, have internal dynamics that put them in danger of conflict occurring, or be in an at risk region with insecure borders or other factors. No ongoing significant insecurity or conflict but tensions and risks present in some areas. No significant humanitarian crisis or needs but may be significant levels of poverty and inequitable access to services and resources. | <p>Identification and close monitoring of regions or groups specifically at risk and an emphasis on both prevention, preparedness and building/strengthening resilience among groups and institutions.</p> | <p>Child reintegration support and services mainstreamed within an increasingly systems-strengthening approach; nationally led with capacity building support as needed through sector mechanisms. Monitoring and prevention activities need to be in place, with elements of advocacy and awareness raising as required.</p> |

It is also worth noting that while reintegration activities for adults have been seen historically been part of a post-conflict framework, they have increasingly been carried out in the absence of formal peace agreements and even in the midst of conflict. In these situations, local Governments and civil society organizations have been at the forefront of providing support⁸. The recent revision of the Integrated Disarmament Demobilization and Reintegration Standards (IDDRS), and in particular the new IDDRS 2.40, now recognizes the importance of reintegration of adults outside formal DDR programs. This recognition is also helpful for the reintegration for children as their support has always been prioritized as soon as they leave an armed force or group, regardless if a conflict was still ongoing.

There is substantial experience in working within and across a variety of contexts and institutional settings with children in particular. However, many child reintegration programs have historically responded to the release of children “forcibly” recruited into armed groups. There is still much to be learned about how best to respond in situations where children are influenced by community drivers, as well as those who exit armed groups informally across the range of typologies highlighted in Table 1.

Clearly the above typologies are only indicative and in reality situations and countries can present even more nuanced variants. It is also important to note that situations are often highly fluid and may move between these typologies on a regular basis. There can also be variations within countries in terms of the security and political situation in particular regions. However, they do highlight that when considering funding instruments and mechanisms, decisions need to be based on a clear analysis and proper understanding of the context in which they will be deployed.

2.2 Overarching principles

When considering existing and potential financing modalities and mechanisms it is important to consider and apply overarching principles wherever possible to maximally impact the situation for children. These should be informed by and take into account, inter alia, the [Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness \(2005\)](#), [The Principles and Guidelines on Children Associated with Armed Forces or Armed Groups \(2007\)](#) and the [Integrated Disarmament Demobilization and Reintegration Standards](#)⁹ along with other frameworks such as the Sustaining Peace Agenda.

Key principles relevant to financing, drawn principally from the CAAFAG principles, include;

- **Coordination.** This is important to address the complexities surrounding this issue. Comprehensive support to reintegration requires coordinated action **across a range of services and sectors** including health, education and training, and support for livelihoods. This is needed over a protracted period of time across the HDP-N and in a way which increasingly builds and strengthens the role and ownership of local actors and authorities (see below). Effective coordination, multi-sectoral approaches and ensuring continuity of response in terms of the HDP-N are essential prerequisites for ensuring the success and positive impact of interventions. Those providing financial support have a role to play in ensuring that the way resources are provided helps to create an enabling environment where coordination, collaboration and cooperation are properly incentivized and not undermined.
- **Accountability and transparency.** This is a key measure for ensuring that interventions run smoothly, are cost effective and accepted by all those concerned. Accountability and

transparency related to resourcing, but also clarity about the expected outputs and strategies to be pursued, are also important. Structures and processes for establishing and ensuring this should involve communities and local and national authorities and not solely funding and implementing agencies and organizations.

- **Importance of context-specific programming.**

For the reasons cited above, it is essential that interventions are informed by a proper analysis and understanding of the situation in which they are to be implemented. A proper analysis of stakeholders, conflict drivers, and the political economy must be undertaken. Social and economic opportunities and challenges need to be assessed realistically. Regular opportunities for program review and adjustment are also important in these contexts as flexible responses are often required to meet needs and respond to fluid situations. Potential risks need to be identified, properly assessed and carefully managed. This includes guarding against undesirable incentives and tension within and between communities and between children themselves. Any interventions must be based on a clear plan and be properly and appropriately coordinated. Those providing finance and designing financial instruments have a critical role to play in helping ensure that the above takes place by making sure that appraisal and application processes require proper assessments to have been undertaken and that mechanisms are in place to ensure the involvement and participation of key stakeholders, including local groups and actors, in program design and assessment (see [Section 2.6](#)).

- **National ownership and capacity strengthening.**

Identifying, working with and seeking to build the capacity of local and national structures

should never be seen as an optional extra but a basic requirement. It is important to recognize that depending on the situation this might mean working mainly with local structures when national ones are either non-existent or weak. It might be necessary to implement directly with and through community groups when national or local authorities are not present or cannot be engaged due to conflict dynamics. Financial instruments should recognize the need to include appropriate levels of resourcing for capacity building and national ownership, including, when appropriate, the need to expect and encourage re-emergent and better capacitated national and local authorities to increasingly make their own provision within sector or other budgets for reintegration efforts. In this regard it is important that funding and resourcing frameworks are aligned to national budget processes and structures as this makes the mainstreaming of long-term services much easier to achieve and advocate for. Even relatively modest contributions or allocations within national budget frameworks by national Governments can show political intent and commitment, not only to both to those providing external finance but also to communities and groups themselves.

- **Linkages with the SDGs.** As is highlighted in the Reframing Reintegration paper, all 17 SDGs relate in some way to children and are relevant to CAAFAG. In adopting the SDGs, governments agreed to end the recruitment and use of children by armed forces or armed groups by 2030 (Target 8.7). As such, the SDGs provide for a harmonized way of working so that interventions not only meet the needs of those affected, but also reduce future risks and vulnerabilities.

2.3 Tracking resource flows and channels


Data on resource flows were examined and explored. Using the list of countries highlighted in the Secretary-General's Annual Report, Table 2 provides a basis for analysis by highlighting figures for 2017 drawn from the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD). These show total flows of Official Development Assistance (ODA).¹⁰ Allocations have been broken down into those reported as *humanitarian* and those reflected as *development* expenditure. The top three donors by volume of resource flows during 2017 are also highlighted. Since 2016, the OECD/DAC has also been collecting data from a number of [major philanthropic organizations](#) and the figures for 2017 are also reflected in Table 2.

In the OECD/DAC Reporting System there are a series of "Purpose Codes" which are intended to track different types of expenditure and are completed by donors reporting expenditure. Purpose Codes track sectoral expenditure and are broken down into sub-categories which are further divided into main category, sub-category and lower Level "CRS" Codes.

Usefully, from the point of view of tracking child reintegration, under the main category of Infrastructure and Services (100), sub-category Conflict Prevention and Resolution, Peace and Security (152) there is a lower level Creditor Reporting System code defined as; Child Soldiers Prevention and Demobilization (15261) which is defined as: **"Technical co-operation provided to government—and assistance to civil society organizations"—to support and apply legislation designed to prevent the recruitment of child soldiers, and to demobilize, disarm, reintegrate, repatriate and resettle (DDR) child soldiers.**"¹¹

Reported expenditure against this code for the period 2013-2017 is shown in Figure 2. Between

Figure 2. Gross disbursements against CRS Marker 15261 by region and unearmarked 2013-2017



Source: OECD/DAC Stats October 31, 2019.

2013-2017 there was an overall fall in funding but 2017 saw significant increase (with major expenditure in Colombia and DRC in particular).

Table 3 shows financial disbursements against the child soldiers' marker over a five-year period in selected countries and takes into account unallocated thematic funding (see Table 4). This demonstrates that levels of overall funding vary significantly in terms of annual spend. In part, this reflects developments in these countries as both the conflict and situation changed and it became possible to obtain the release of children. However, it is possible that the focus and intensity of the support provided was quite time limited, and for relatively short-term, acute and humanitarian needs. Just under 70 percent of the reported spend was allocated to three countries/situations (Colombia, South Sudan and the DRC).

A closer examination of 2017 data suggests that resources allocated against this expenditure

Table 2. ODA flows to selected countries as humanitarian/development assistance, 2017 (million \$)

| Country | Typology | Total ODA and top 3 sector allocations (DAC markers) | | | Top 3 bilaterals (by volume) | Philanthropic |
|------------------------------|----------|--|----------------|-----------------|-----------------------------------|---------------|
| | | Development | Humanitarian | Total | | |
| Afghanistan | II | 2,578.5 | 318.2 | 2,736.7 | USA, Germany, UK | 26.7 |
| Central African Republic | II | 95.8 | 198.1 | 293.9 | USA, Germany, France | 1.9 |
| Colombia | IV | 1,263.1 | 43.4 | 1,306.5 | Netherlands, Germany, Switzerland | 12.1 |
| Democratic Republic of Congo | II | 697.7 | 463.6 | 1,161.3 | USA, UK, Belgium | 29.8 |
| Iraq | III | 1,898.5 | 1,181.8 | 3,080.3 | Germany, France, USA | 2.0 |
| Lebanon | III | 515.6 | 596.6 | 1,112.2 | Germany, USA, UK | 6.5 |
| Libya | I | 333.3 | 90.9 | 424.2 | Italy, France, USA | N/A |
| Mali | II | 716.2 | 82.3 | 798.5 | France, USA, Canada | 12.2 |
| Myanmar | IV | 1,917.0 | 145.0 | 2,062.0 | Japan, Korea, USA | 19.9 |
| Nigeria | III | 909.7 | 728.8 | 1,638.5 | USA, Netherlands, Germany | 194.4 |
| Somalia | III | 280.9 | 1,043.5 | 1,324.4 | UK, USA, Germany | 3.8 |
| South Sudan | II | 401.4 | 999.6 | 1,401.0 | USA, UK, Germany | 4.1 |
| Sudan | III | 153.9 | 313.3 | 467.2 | USA, UK, Germany | 0.7 |
| Syrian Arab Republic | II | 696.6 | 2,226.1 | 2,922.7 | Germany, USA, UK | 5.1 |
| West Bank and Gaza Strip | III | 876.5 | 228.4 | 1,104.9 | USA, Germany, UK | 0.3 |
| Yemen | I | 166.3 | 1,181.9 | 1,348.2 | USA, UK, Germany | 1.8 |
| Total | | 13,501.0 | 9,841.5 | 23,182.5 | | 321.3 |

Source: OECD/DAC Stats 2019.

Table 3. Disbursements to selected countries and unearmarked to CRS Code 15261 2013–2017 (constant million \$)

| Country | 2013 | 2014 | 2015 | 2016 | 2017 | 2013–2017 |
|------------------------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|--------------|--------------|
| Central African Republic | 0 | 0 | 0.34 | 0.02 | 0.08 | 0.44 |
| Democratic Republic of Congo | 3.61 | 0.75 | 2.71 | 2.36 | 3.74 | 13.17 |
| Mali | 0.02 | 0.01 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0.03 |
| Nigeria | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0.56 | 0.56 |
| Somalia | 0 | 0 | 0.19 | 0 | 0.29 | 0.48 |
| South Sudan | 0.06 | 0.06 | 0.21 | 0.02 | 2.24 | 2.59 |
| Sudan | 0.06 | 0.06 | 0.19 | 0 | 0 | 0.31 |
| Colombia | 4.49 | 2.17 | 1.25 | 0.55 | 1.53 | 9.99 |
| Afghanistan | 0 | 0 | 0.21 | 0 | 0 | 0.21 |
| Myanmar | 0.30 | 0 | 0.82 | 0.24 | 0 | 1.36 |
| Lebanon | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0.05 | 0 | 0.05 |
| West Bank and Gaza Strip | 0.02 | 0.02 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0.04 |
| Yemen | 0 | 0.24 | 0.23 | 0 | 0 | 0.47 |
| Unearmarked (thematic) | 1.09 | 1.29 | 1.07 | 0.69 | 3.29 | 7.43 |
| Totals | 9.65 | 4.59 | 7.23 | 3.92 | 11.74 | 37.12 |

Source: Data extracted 31102019 from OECD stat.

Table 4. CRS Code 15261 allocations in 2017 grouped by top 4 bilateral donors in descending order by volume

| # | Donor | Allocation (million \$) | Brief description/comment |
|---|---------|-------------------------|--|
| 1 | Sweden | 3.32 | \$2.1 million of which was thematic funding not earmarked to country level (to UNICEF) and \$1.17 million unearmarked thematic funding to INGO (Plan Intl) |
| 2 | Germany | 2.25 | Entire allocation is one single contribution for South Sudan earmarked for a UNICEF intervention; this has this marker but is a wider protection intervention |
| 3 | Canada | 1.85 | ~\$1 million focused on support through UNICEF to training/development of procedures for AU Peace Operations handling of CAAFAG; ~\$0.5 million project support in Mindanao (UNICEF) |
| 4 | Belgium | 1.55 | Most of this allocation was provided to UNICEF earmarked for DRC with a small allocation through Government channels in CAR for prevention of recruitment |

Source: OECD/DAC Stats October 2019.

marker are provided through relatively few primary channels.¹² In 2017, the bulk of these resources went through UNICEF with a smaller, but not insignificant, percentage being provided to INGOs. In Table 4, the top four bilateral donors against this code in 2017 are listed in descending order by volume.

Although an examination of reported expenditure against CRS code 15261 is useful it is important to caveat the findings. The figures themselves are sometimes adjusted depending on updated reporting. It is also likely that significant volumes of expenditure on child reintegration do not get reported against or captured against this code. This includes humanitarian assistance, which may be allocated against wider protection or other sectoral allocations and reflected as such in the data produced by UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UN OCHA) [Financial Tracking Service](#) (FTS), even though it contributes to the reintegration of CAAFAG. Resources provided via pooled funding and private channels may also not be reflected.

Analysis undertaken by War Child in September 2018¹³ looked at information available from the CRS codes coupled with keyword searches against a number of other datasets (including the UN OCHA FTS) over the period 2012-2016. Although the volume of resources differs slightly, the overall picture is fairly consistent with the above. Other significant thematic donors identified in the War Child analysis (and confirmed in interviews) were also identified as: US, Norway, Japan and Australia. Again, support provided under other thematic or sectoral responses may not always be captured, for example, that provided to broader Technical and Vocational Training to children and young people in conflict-affected areas.¹⁴

2.4 Existing financing instruments and mechanisms

Overview

A significant number of financing instruments and mechanisms are used to provide resources for humanitarian, development and peacebuilding activities across the typologies highlighted in [Section 2.1](#) above. In Table 5, their overall use is described and their specific use in support of child reintegration is highlighted. The table is split into two sections reflecting flows to and through multilateral channels and “others” which largely reflect bilateral aid flows (other than those to multilaterals) and private funds (including those from philanthropic organizations). “Other instruments” also includes financing which may be made through countries’ own budget frameworks. In some settings a range of relatively new and innovative financing instruments are being used. These are not discussed in this table but are specifically considered in [Section 2.6](#).

Additional commentary on pooled funding

UN and national pooled funding mechanisms do not follow a particular template, with programming priorities driving the selection of funding sources and governance, implementation and fiduciary requirements. Implementation modalities are also varied as they may involve UN agencies, mixed or national execution and be country or thematically based. There is increasing emphasis on using countries’ own public financial management systems to channel funds, an objective increasingly integrated into multi-donor funds, particularly in transition contexts. With over 100 funds now in existence and a spend of approximately \$8 billion annually, a dedicated UN-based [Multi Partner Trust Fund Office](#) supports and facilitates the development and management of these instruments.

Table 5. Overview of key funding instruments grouped by multilateral channels and other instruments

| Instrument/mechanism | Broad description | Use in HDP-N contexts | Evidence of use/potential for child reintegration |
|---|--|--|--|
| A: Multilateral channels | | | |
| A1: UN Core Funds | <p>This includes assessed and voluntary contributions that are unearmarked—usually used to fund both operational costs and a variety of activities.</p> <p>Under the Funding Compact, the proportion of resources that are provided as voluntary contributions are supposed to be increasing. However, while this is likely to change, it is important to note that the proportion is so far still relatively small with only 9% of revenue from voluntary core contributions in 2017.¹</p> | <p>With the exception of agencies with a clear humanitarian focus (e.g. OCHA, UNHCR) core funds are likely to be mainly used to support development programming.</p> <p>However, they may be drawn on to support initial response in case of sudden humanitarian needs or for start-up/catalytic funding for new types of interventions, including for surge capacity.</p> | <p>The use of core funds to support child reintegration would appear to be very limited.</p> <p>However, a significant number of respondents provided examples and stressed the importance of core funding in the sense that it is often used at country level to provide immediate funding when sudden changes in a situation occur or to fund assessment or pilot activities but actual use depends on prioritization of reintegration support against other competing priorities.</p> |
| A2: Agency Specific Thematic Funding ² | <p>These relate to contributions to or resources made available as contributions to specific UN agencies by thematic area which, although tagged by theme resources, are then relatively unearmarked in terms of precisely where and how they are used.</p> | <p>May be used across the typologies highlighted in Table 1.</p> <p>A number of respondents reported that overall levels of funding/earmarking at thematic levels have fallen—with more emphasis on pooled or core funding by donors.</p> | <p>Specific thematic contributions for Children Affected by Armed Conflict (CAAC) has historically been provided by donors to UNICEF in particular but levels of earmarked resourcing for CAAC as a thematic area are said to be falling. Funding is usually annual, but extensions can be requested and are usually granted.</p> <p>Allows agency receiving funds access to discretionary resources which can be used with a reasonable degree of flexibility based on emerging priorities. However, this instrument does not particularly incentivize joint analysis or partnerships with other organizations.</p> |

| Instrument/ mechanism | Broad description | Use in HDP-N contexts | Evidence of use/potential for child reintegration |
|---|--|---|---|
| A3: Agency Specific Projects ² | <p>Contributions or responses made available to specific UN agency projects which are usually country or regionally focused but may occasionally be thematic. They differ from the above in that support is earmarked for specific activities and objectives rather than themes. Funding may be sought centrally or at country offices of the agency concerned.</p> | <p>Used across HDP-N contexts. With increased use of pooled funding in humanitarian, recovery and development contexts, volume of resourcing through these instruments is likely to decrease.</p> <p>However, still widely used across HDP-N for a variety of interventions at country level. Key partners mentioned as Sweden, Denmark, Japan, Canada. Funding periods often limited to 12-18 months but often with possibility of extension if circumstances require.</p> | <p>Reported as one of the primary instruments still in use to support child reintegration interventions with projects developed at country/regional level and funding sought and obtained from bilateral donors.</p> <p>Project support does provide potential for rapid response and child reintegration focused programming but agency specificity does not necessarily encourage joint partnerships or planning. Some respondents commented that potential for extension of timelines is not the same as a guarantee and inevitably still leads to relatively short-term planning.</p> |
| A4: UN or WB Pooled Funds | <p>There is a growing number of pooled funds operated and led by both the UN and World Bank/IDA. These cover an extremely wide range of thematic, regional and country level issues and are an “area of growth” in terms of volume of resourcing from bilateral donors to the UN system in particular.</p> <p>Under the Funding Compact, a target has been established that the volume of contributions to pooled funds should double by 2023 (to \$3.4 billion) and top fully resource 2 “flagship” funds the Joint SDG Fund and the UN Peacebuilding Fund (PBF).</p> | <p>Increasingly, a wide variety of types of pooled funding mechanisms straddle the HDP-N and include, for example—the Central Emergency Response Fund, Regional or Country level Humanitarian Response Frameworks and Appeals, the Joint SDG Fund and the Peacebuilding Fund, as well as World Bank/IDA resources directed at Fragility Conflict and Violence (FCV).</p> | <p>Pooled funds appear to be of growing importance for child reintegration given their use in FCV/HDP-N contexts.</p> <p>During interviews, the Peacebuilding Fund was reported to have been used specifically to finance child reintegration activities, and both CERF and a number of Humanitarian Frameworks³ examined also included child reintegration activities—under support channeled through the protection cluster.</p> <p>Further specific comment and analysis on the use of pooled funding mechanisms can be found at 2.4.2. below.</p> |

| Instrument/ mechanism | Broad description | Use in HDP-N contexts | Evidence of use/potential for child reintegration |
|---|--|--|---|
| B: Other instruments | | | |
| B1: Bilateral Projects— Country and Regional level | <p>These are resources provided by “traditional” OECD donors in support of country and /or regional plans or frameworks. They may include the funding of projects or programs with NGOs (usually through grant-making arrangements or mechanisms⁴) or project management and delivery using private contractors and/ or with Government partners (e.g. line ministries).</p> | <p>Although their use is more common in development contexts, these mechanisms are also used in humanitarian and, quite extensively, across HDP-N contexts.</p> | <p>Examples of their recent use to support child reintegration, for example, by INGOs appears quite limited with several NGO respondents reporting that bilateral donors tend to prefer to fund through UN agencies and/or via pooled funding mechanisms.</p> |
| B2: “On Budget” Resourcing | <p>This refers to a range of funding instruments usually used by bilateral donors but also by the World Bank, and sometimes UN agencies, to support sector plans and activities with national Governments.</p> <p>These may range from General Budget Support (GBS) where donors agree to put unearmarked funds into the recipient’s national budget, to Sector-Wide Approaches (SWAs) where a pooled or basket mechanism is used at a country level to put earmarked resources into or through the Government budget for a specific sector or group of sectors.</p> | <p>This type of support implies that there are quite high degrees of confidence in the recipient Governments’ stability, priorities, systems and capability and that fiduciary risk is thought to be at least manageable.</p> <p>As a result, these mechanisms are more likely to be used to finance development activities, but they may be used to resource capacity building and recovery of services in key sectors in countries emerging from conflict.</p> | <p>Identifying when and where these types of instruments have been used to support child reintegration can be difficult as these resources are earmarked at sector level and are not for specific projects.</p> <p>However, examples can be found and include: funding of support to children released for armed groups in Rwanda whose ongoing reintegration was supported by the Government’s DDR Commission, and in Uganda where support for Justice Law and Order services included a provision to help ensure that former CAAFAG requiring legal support could obtain it.</p> <p>It is important to note that when examples of the use of these types of instruments can be found they represent encouraging signs that responsibility for service provision is being both assumed and to some degree performed by national authorities and Governments.</p> |

| Instrument/mechanism | Broad description | Use in HDP-N contexts | Evidence of use/potential for child reintegration |
|--|--|--|---|
| B3: Country Level Pooled or Basket Funding | In some situations, pooled or basket funding mechanisms have been developed by bilateral donors, outside UN/WB pooled fund processes, allowing donors to pool resources for a specific project or program, although sometimes contributions may also be received from the UN and WB. The day-to-day management of the fund is often contracted to a third party along with technical program management. | Use of these instruments for humanitarian support is fairly rare but they have been used quite commonly in other settings, and for supporting policy advocacy, research and development. | The research did not reveal specific examples of the use of these instruments to support child reintegration. |
| B4: Specific Thematic Bilateral Funds | A significant number of specific funding instruments have been established in an attempt to find mechanisms for supporting work and projects that may often be considered “too risky” or fall outside traditional ODA criteria. | By their nature, these types of funding instruments are usually intended to have a higher appetite for risk in terms of the types of activity and locations they will operate in. Examples include the UK’s Conflict, Stability and Security Fund. | The research did not reveal any specific instruments for supporting child reintegration, although some may fund activities related to child protection and disassociation and release. The security-related focus of some of these instruments can create some discomfort in their relationship with child protection or humanitarian agencies. |

¹ Source: “Financing the UN Development System—Time for Hard Choices,” UN MPTF Office and Dag Hammarskjöld Foundation, p. 29.

² These are usually contributions or projects supported by bilateral donors although there has been a growing number of contributions provided by large philanthropic foundations and groups in recent years.

⁴ For example, in Nigeria and Somalia.

⁵ Grants of this nature are usually conditional with funding provided against a specific project document /results framework with agreed budget lines.

A discussion paper commissioned by the UN Development Group in 2016 entitled [The Role of UN Pooled Financing Mechanisms to deliver the 2030 Sustainable Development Agenda](#) found that in fragile and humanitarian contexts, a small number of well capitalized pooled funds can help to improve aid effectiveness and promote alignment among a range of actors as long as they are well designed and appropriately capitalized.

Given their increasing importance, it is worth investigating some examples of pooled funding and their utility and potential application for child reintegration. A number of specific instruments are briefly highlighted and described below.

The UN Central Emergency Response Fund.

Since its inception in 2006, the [Central Emergency Response Fund](#) (CERF) has made available over \$5.5 billion in funding to over 100 countries with

contributions from traditional donors but also regional Governments, international corporations, NGOs and even individuals. Applications for support must be based on funding priorities established on the ground and agreed to by the Humanitarian/Resident Coordinator. Funding is made available through 2 specific windows: (a) Rapid Response and, (b) Underfunded emergencies. Resources are only directly provided to UN agencies although it is increasingly stressed that efforts should be made to engage with NGO and Government partners.

Utility and Use for Child Reintegration: The focus of the CERF is on the provision of immediate and lifesaving support within a six-month period. It is almost certain that CERF resources will have been used in the past to meet the immediate reintegration needs of CAAFAG. However, it has not been possible to track these definitively through the system. Protection interventions are likely to be targeted at a wider population group and not necessarily disaggregated on the basis of CAAFAG and their communities. However, a few examples of its specific use in support of child reintegration include:

- In **South Sudan** in 2016 a CERF response to conflict-related displacement included interventions intended to address issues putting children at risk of recruitment and support for those that had previously been involved with an armed group. CERF funding provided case management for unaccompanied children, psychosocial support, youth engagement, community-based protection mechanisms building on child friendly spaces, and additional learning spaces to provide basic education and life skills.
- In the **Central African Republic** in 2015 CERF Funding helped support 500 children associated with armed groups to be released and benefit from interim care in transitional structures

and family reunification; an additional 4,980 community leaders and youth, including armed group leaders, were reached through mobilization campaigns on GBV and family separation, as well as sensitizing them on the monitoring of violations and child protection risks.

A key benefit of the CERF has been its ability to deploy additional resources relatively rapidly to environments where resource constraints are significant. However, a drawback has been that it cannot provide long-term support to these caseloads.

The United Nations Peacebuilding Fund. The Peacebuilding Fund (PBF) was launched in 2006 “to support activities, actions, programs and organizations that seek to build a lasting peace in countries emerging from conflict.” It has two main facilities: (a) An **Immediate Response Facility**, which enables rapid response to jump start peacebuilding and recovery needs for interventions of up to one-year duration. Proposals must be submitted by the senior UN representative and if they meet the criteria they may receive funding within three weeks. Under this facility, funding for packages of projects of up to \$15 million are possible for a maximum duration of 18 months; (b) **The Peacebuilding and Recovery Facility** is intended to support a more structured process driven by national actors based on a joint needs assessment and analysis in designated priority countries¹⁵ that leads to the establishment of a Peacebuilding Priority Plan and associated results and M&E Framework. Under this package, funding for a period of up to three years is possible. Both facilities channel funding through recipient UN agencies.

Interventions supported by the PBF are in four Priority Areas:

- **Priority Area 1:** Support the implementation of peace agreements and political dialogue
 - Security sector reform
 - Rule of law
 - Disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR)
 - Political dialogue
- **Priority Area 2:** Promote coexistence and peaceful resolution of conflict
 - National reconciliation
 - Democratic governance
 - Conflict prevention/management
- **Priority Area 3:** Revitalize the economy and generate immediate peace dividends
 - Employment
 - Equitable access to social services
- **Priority Area 4:** Re-establish essential administrative services

Utility for Child Reintegration: The PBF was highlighted by several field level respondents as having been a source of funding for child reintegration activities alongside wider protection and peacebuilding activities with, in most cases, funding allocated under Priority Area 1. As with the CERF, the ability to directly track interventions and expenditure is limited as activities can often be a component of broader efforts supporting both children and wider peacebuilding. Respondents recounted examples from the Philippines and Guinea, while two specific examples provided by the PBF from Myanmar and Somalia are highlighted below:

- **Myanmar 2015:** A project aimed at preventing the recruitment and use of children by armed forces and groups with a spend of \$1.5 million.
- **Somalia 2017:** A \$3 million project aimed at supporting the voluntary and safe return of refugees from Kenya including support for the reintegration of children formerly associated with armed groups including the creation of livelihood opportunities.

The Sustainable Development Goals Fund.

The [SDG Fund](#) was created in 2014 to support sustainable development through integrated and [multidimensional joint programs](#). Its objective was to bring together UN agencies, national governments, academia, civil society and business to address the challenges of poverty, and to promote the 2030 Agenda. The SDG Fund has supported joint programs [in 23 countries](#) with a budget of approximately \$70 million. It has included work in a number of fragile and conflict-affected contexts, for example: in Colombia it included support for a project in the northern Cauca territories, which are predominantly populated by indigenous communities deeply affected by the armed conflict, aimed at re-establishing agriculture and improving nutrition.

Although a number of projects are still active, the SDG Fund has been replaced by the [Joint SDG Fund](#) which is intended to provide support for a range of interventions aimed at supporting the delivery of the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development. Up to \$60 million funded the first round of projects on “Leave No One Behind” and Social Protection.

Utility for Child Reintegration: At the time of writing, it was not possible to review the Concept Notes submitted under the first call for proposals. However, given the Fund’s emphasis on “Leave No One Behind” and Social Protection, it is envisaged

that scope exists for support for reintegration and this is worth further exploration.

The Transitional Demobilization and Reintegration Program and the GPRS.

The Transitional Demobilization and Reintegration Program (TDRP) was a World Bank–managed program financed by the Multi Donor Trust Fund aimed at supporting the return of ex-combatants to civilian life in the African Great Lakes region. It followed in the footsteps of the larger regional DDR effort in the Great Lakes called the Multi-country Demobilization and Reintegration Program. A new fund has since been established with a similar focus: Global Program for Reintegration Support (GPRS). This will continue the good work of the TDRP, but with a global—not regional—focus. This is currently focused just on adults, but there is scope for including a specific window for children.

Utility for Child Reintegration: The new GPRS provides a unique and higher profile opportunity to include children more specifically in reintegration priorities and programming, as well as fund at higher levels. Although the main objective of the MDRP and TDRP was to support national level DDR activities for adults, support was provided for child reintegration on a number of occasions. This included funding for the UEPN-DDR in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) which has supported the reintegration of over 31,000 children, support to various phases of the national DDR program in Rwanda which saw the reintegration of up to 500 children and, in Burundi support for the [Burundi Child Soldier Demobilization, Social Reintegration and Recruitment Prevention Special Project](#) where funding from the MDRP enabled UNICEF and the Burundi Ministry of National Solidarity, Human Rights and Gender to work with NGOs and CBOs at local level to support children’s reintegration and also to help prevent new recruitment of child ex-combatants, into either armed groups or criminal activity.

Country Level Frameworks. Processes and instruments such as UN Sustainable Development Cooperation Frameworks (UNSDCFs, formerly known as UNDAFs), and Humanitarian Appeals and Frameworks are not always funding instruments per se. Some have specific common funds attached to them and others are chiefly planning and coordination frameworks that are intended to build consensus, partnerships and facilitate and track common objectives and indicators. Related instruments aimed more specifically at promoting stabilization include the [Funding Facility for Stabilization in Iraq](#) and its counterpart in Libya. In many cases they are growing in their complexity and sophistication as mechanisms for establishing priorities and coordinating interventions in complex contexts across the HDP-N. Good examples of these include the [UN Strategic Framework for Somalia](#) that includes specific child protection activities aimed at children released from armed groups and the [UN Sustainable Development Partnership Framework for Nigeria](#) that aims to support the development of protection strategies to address vulnerable children including those exposed to the risks of forced recruitment into armed groups. In a cross-section of Humanitarian Response Frameworks examined for this paper, those for Colombia, Mali and Myanmar all specified the need for protection activities for CAAC, with Mali and Myanmar also mentioning the need for activities with CAAFAG specifically.

Utility for Child Reintegration: If specific child reintegration needs and/or vulnerabilities can be identified and included in country level frameworks, they can become a strong lever and a vehicle for coordinated and joined up cross sectoral/cross-HDP-N action and resourcing. As highlighted previously, financial and even narrative reports may not necessarily disaggregate data by CAAFAG.

European Commission Resourcing and Instruments

In addition to the above, it is important to note that the European Commission is an extremely important source of funding in humanitarian, stabilization and development contexts. The European Union as a whole is the world's leading provider of ODA with support totaling \$83.3 billion in 2017.¹⁶ While some of this reflects bilateral expenditure from member states, a significant proportion also resourcing from the Commission's own financing instruments. Development policy is set out in the [European Consensus on Development](#). With a focus on poverty eradication, it also seeks to create interlinkages between development, peace and humanitarian assistance.

Overall, resource allocations are established within a multiannual financial framework (MFF), which runs from 2014 to 2020. The European Development Fund (EDF) at \$34.4 billion (2014-2020) and the Development Cooperation Instrument (DCI) at \$22.2 billion are currently the key instruments for the EU's ODA to developing countries. Humanitarian assistance is provided through the European Civil Protection and Humanitarian Aid Operations Department (ECHO) and in many situations ECHO has provided substantial support to meet immediate needs and for protection through its humanitarian responses through partners, including the UN and NGOs.

Also worthy of particular note is an instrument specifically established to support stabilization and peacebuilding initiatives. Known as the [Instrument contributing to Stability and Peace](#) (IcSP), it provides resources to activities related to: (1) crisis response, (2) conflict prevention, peacebuilding and crisis preparedness, as well as, (3) response to global, trans-regional and emerging threats. There are a number of specific examples of where the IcSP has been used in support of reintegration and

prevention activities and some of these are briefly highlighted in Table 6.

2.5 Local- or national-level “On Budget” resourcing

National/local ownership is a critical component of ensuring that solutions are appropriate and that they are sustainable in the long term, especially where aspects of support require long-term service delivery. As previously highlighted, even relatively modest contributions or allocations within national budget frameworks by national Governments can send important signals of political intent and commitment, both to those providing external finance but also to communities and groups themselves.

In some instances, local authorities and groups, even in the midst of conflict may make considerable efforts to provide support alongside civil society or other partners. For example, in Uganda, in districts affected by the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA), District Local Governments were often at the forefront of service provision for children being released from the group as well as lobbying for more resources from the national Government. In the longer term, additional resourcing provided through the national budget included increased sectoral allocations in education, health and community services to help address the needs of these and other conflict-affected groups.

Identifying and tracking these types of resource allocations and budget processes may be quite difficult as funds will usually be part of wider sector planning frameworks and processes, including Sector-Wide Approaches or National Development Plans. However, considerable work is being done to build capacity at both international and national levels to track and monitor progress towards the Sustainable Development Goals and lessons learned from efforts with the MDGs are also worth

Table 6. Examples of interventions in support of child reintegration funded through the IcSP instrument

| | |
|---------------------|---|
| Colombia | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • An IcSP-funded and UNICEF-implemented action focused on reintegrating children and adolescents disengaged from the FARC-EP and other non-state armed groups. It included support to help them realize their rights, access comprehensive reparations, livelihoods, and participation in reconciliation and peacebuilding. • Support through Oxfam, Benposta Nacion de Muchachos and Humanidad Vigente Corporación Jurídica helped to respond to the protection needs of vulnerable young people, particularly supporting the social reintegration of young people who were previously part of armed groups or otherwise affected by the armed conflict, through the provision of psychosocial, legal and community support. • Support to a program implemented by the Norwegian Refugee Council has helped protect children at high risk of recruitment and their reintegration in the departments of Cauca, Nariño, Putumayo and Norte de Santander. |
| Colombia and Brazil | Focusing on the protection of Venezuelan refugees and migrants, support is provided through UNHCR, IOM and UNFPA at the borders with Brazil and Colombia. Particular attention is given to increasing protective environments for children, helping prevent forced recruitment of children and promoting a “culture of peace” and peaceful coexistence. |
| Venezuela | Four IcSP-funded actions support strengthening of families, schools and civil society organizations as peace agents for the promotion of peacebuilding activities, conflict prevention and peaceful coexistence as well as protection of children and adolescents in contexts of violence and social crisis. |
| Global | Action implemented by UNESCO aims to increase equitable access to quality education for children and youth in crisis situations by supporting the education sector in fragile and crisis-affected countries in planning for and thereby reducing risks of conflict and disaster. Activities of this type can be important instruments to help prevent the recruitment of children and young people. |

Source: European Commission 2019.

noting. Although fully achieving this is a long-term and quite complex task, two easy “quick wins” suggested by the International Budget Partnership¹⁷ include:

- Encouraging the publishing and updating of information on budgets as a first critical step thereby allowing information sharing on budget allocations and expenditures;
- Dialogue at country level on budget classifications and encouraging alignment with the SDGs while recognizing that this may require an extensive effort as part of wider public financial management reform processes.

2.6 Alternative and innovative funding instruments

In addition to the collection of funding instruments highlighted above there have been a number of alternative instruments that are either increasingly used, tried and tested, or are being developed and piloted, including within insecure contexts and across the typologies highlighted in [Section 2.1](#). For the purposes of this paper Innovation can be described as: **“The implementation of improved ideas, knowledge and practices. It implies novelty and brings benefits to processes, products, marketing and /or organization. It can be applied in an incremental, radical or systemic way.”**¹⁸

The development and deployment of some of these instruments has, in part, been driven by a growing recognition that, while some of the activities required to develop and sustain peace across the HDP-N require structural and long-term changes that may need to be driven and owned by Governments and other authorities, in many conflict-affected environments communities and individuals themselves have often found ways to work around and through barriers impeding their recovery. Examples include the use of remittances to support families, the growth in small and medium enterprises (SMEs) even during conflict, and other forms of local assistance and coping mechanisms. It is also increasingly recognized that existing instruments and approaches, and in some

cases institutional delivery mechanisms, may not be well suited to providing the kinds of flexible support required to best nurture these types of smaller-scale activities and that new ideas and mechanisms need to be proactively explored.¹⁹ Two examples of instruments and approaches that have been used are highlighted and described in Table 7 with an analysis of their utility in terms of support for child reintegration.

However, in addition to the instruments, the available evidence seems to suggest that careful thought needs to be given to how support is managed and delivered. It can be argued that large public sector and multilateral agencies (including many INGOs) may struggle to have the flexibility

Table 7. Two examples of alternative and innovative financing arrangements of potential utility in child reintegration

| Instrument | Description | Potential utility |
|-----------------|--|---|
| Challenge funds | Challenge funds can be defined as cost-sharing grant schemes designed to challenge the private sector or civil society to propose innovative new models to address a particular issue, usually on a replicable and sustainable basis. By providing support and funding, the organization offering the Challenge Fund is helping to stimulate activity and reduce the risk involved in setting up or piloting a new venture in a challenging environment or one where the private sector may be reluctant to venture. ¹ Examples include the Girls Education Challenge Fund established by UK DFID which partnered with the Nike Foundation. These instruments are often run on a day-to-day basis by a managing agent. | No specific examples of the use of challenge funds were found during the research. However, challenge funds could support a range of services to support child reintegration including vocational and employment training and even education support. |
| Impact bonds | Impact bonds use money from private investors to finance programs, who in turn earn a return if the program is successful, paid by a third-party (often private) donor. The outcomes to be measured are agreed upon at the outset and independently verified. With greater focus on outcomes instead of inputs, Impact Bonds create space for more innovation, local problem-solving, and adaptation. There is potential for their use across the HDP-N. Examples of success are the Cataract Development Impact Bond in Cameroon to improve access to eye surgery and the development by ICRC of a humanitarian impact bond as a way of encouraging social investments from the private sector in conflict-affected environments used to support programs of up to five years with payments made by “investors” (often traditional donors) based on planned impact. | There could be scope for using Impact Bonds to provide support services for child reintegration over a protracted period in a way that fosters and encourages local service provision and the reestablishment and capacity building of sustainable models of service delivery or to stimulate employment opportunities and apprenticeships. |

¹ For more information see [Understanding Challenge Funds](#), Pompa, ODI, 2013.

and agility necessary to support such initiatives. As a result, funding opportunities are often missed and local initiatives in particular may struggle to attract funding as local service providers or groups may not have the capacity to meet the standards required to obtain grants or loans from these types of organizations. Those that do may, in the process of trying, fundamentally change the nature of the organization they are trying to support, or its ethos in a way which might detract from the reason it had local legitimacy and was successful in the first place. Recognizing the need to find more flexible ways of providing support and funding peacebuilding and sustaining peace, there is currently significant discussion around mechanisms for achieving this and how to address the power dynamics inherent in traditional approaches which often disadvantage and disempower local and smaller actors and groups.²⁰ There have been interesting attempts to find new ways of supporting a range of initiatives. One example from the education sector, the Education Cannot Wait Fund, is highlighted in the box.

In some situations, existing funding instruments and delivery mechanisms which already have national acceptance and local ownership may be re-energized or used as a mechanism to support community and locally-based initiatives, and ensure local ownership in a situation where this would otherwise be extremely difficult. Although it is not child reintegration support focused, a UNDP-led and EU-funded intervention in Yemen, [Social Protection for Community Resilience in Yemen](#), is a good example of this. This program uses an existing and trusted mechanism which maintains legitimacy and acceptance across communities separated by conflict, to channel resources to local structures who deliver services and interventions such as health and nutrition support, cash-based employment²¹, psychosocial support and support to enable the continuing function of basic services by local authorities.

The [Education Cannot Wait Fund](#) sought to bring together a range of actors (public and private) to support initiatives rather than create a new or parallel institution. The two financing mechanisms—an Acceleration Facility and a Breakthrough Fund—were intended to provide value by enabling agencies to do more of what they currently do well, while mobilizing and disbursing new funds and leveraging additional support. This flexibility built into the proposal, enabled financing to be calibrated against the needs and circumstances of individual countries, including local stakeholders. Support was provided through three investment windows:

- **First Emergency Response:** supports education programs immediately in sudden-onset or escalating crises;
- **Multi-Year Resilience:** addresses longer-term needs through multi-year joint programs in protracted crises;
- **Acceleration Facility:** supports research and data collection, advancing practice and promoting innovation, learning outcomes and gender-targeted interventions in education in emergencies.

The Fund is hosted by UNICEF, with operations run by the Fund's own independent governance structure via a high-level Steering Group with representatives from Governments, Multilaterals and the Private Sector.

2.7 Emerging issues

In this section, some of the major findings emerging from the sections above are further distilled. Specific recommendations and potential options are then further outlined in [Section 3](#).

Importance of context analysis

Financing mechanisms should help to underpin and strengthen the operational principles highlighted in [Section 2.1](#) of this document. The right choice of instruments used at the right time can help to do this; however equally, the wrong ones can undermine efforts to ensure that interventions have impact and, critically, that they do no harm.

“We must always make sure we understand who we are working with, what led to where we are now and future risks and opportunities.”
—Field Practitioner

A number of respondents during the interviews spoke of the importance of understanding the context within which interventions need to be framed and implemented. In addition to overall issues related to the planning and design of interventions, it is also important that those making resources available consider whether they are selecting and using the appropriate funding instruments and mechanisms.

Common assessment processes and frameworks are being increasingly used in some of the contexts [for example in Nigeria, Somalia and Iraq (see [2.4.2 Country Frameworks](#))]. In some cases, significant progress seems to have been made at country level in ensuring that multiple stakeholders and sectors are involved. It is also important that efforts are strengthened to ensure that they include and represent the views and concerns of local communities. Doing this in conflict-affected environments requires careful thought and planning, recognizing that social cohesion may itself have been badly affected by conflict and should be conducted consistent with principle of “do no harm.”

Key findings and recommendations can be found in [Section 3.1](#).

Levels of funding

Tracking actual levels of expenditure is difficult in practice. Despite the presence of specific funding codes at OECD/DAC which provide useful information, these do not necessarily reflect or capture the full extent of support provided which may be mainstreamed within other cluster or sector spends and programs.

While in many situations there may be considerable deficits in the level of funding available for child reintegration, a key point highlighted by a significant number of respondents was the importance of the **predictability and sustainability of funding** across the HDP-N. In some situations, too much money too soon allocated to where it cannot be properly spent or absorbed, or where the supporting institutional and organizational architecture is not present, may itself give rise to problems. This can be in terms of the creation of undesired incentives or of approaches and structures which cannot be evolved or mainstreamed into nationally owned systems or services in the long run. Multi-year and predictable funding also fosters the development of relationships at the program level—including the promotion of national ownership and capacity building of Governments (national and local) where and when appropriate.

“Let’s remember that too much money can be as problematic as too little if it is not properly sequenced and programmed.”
—Program Specialist, UN agency

However, there is consensus that sufficient and more predictable funding over a sustained period of time is required to ensure that support can be provided to a range of caseloads with different experiences and needs. There is clear empirical evidence that the types of violence to which many CAAFAG are exposed not only results in poorer health outcomes for them²² but can also increase the likelihood of their future involvement in violence,

including gender and domestic violence which, particularly in post-conflict or conflict-affected environments, can have a corrosive effect on social cohesion and thus sustained peace.²³

Key findings and recommendations can be found in [Section 3.2](#).

Strategic-level funding instruments

There are a significant number of existing funding instruments and mechanisms and these have evolved substantially over the last few years, particularly with the further development of pooled funding mechanisms at both central, country and regional levels.

Commitments under the Funding Compact would suggest that pooled mechanisms in particular are likely to attract more resources over the next few years. Given that these mechanisms are multi-agency in character, they also have the added benefit of incentivizing common analysis and cooperation between UN agencies and with national and NGO partners. In most cases, project documents have to be prepared by multiple stakeholders and across agencies and be based on common analysis. At the same time, generally UN agencies are the main channel for resources is an ongoing source of frustration for some NGOs who expressed concern over delays in the transfer and the predictability of resources.

“Going through the PBF process did help us to plan together and think of the wider objectives.”
—Field Practitioner

In interviews, the Peacebuilding Fund was identified as a particularly useful source of funds in terms of both immediate but also longer-term response, as it was used in a number of contexts to support longer-term activities and interventions. It was also recognized that applications had to include

activities by more than one UN agency, which promoted coordination and cooperation.

Issues related to CAAFAG and CAAC are also highlighted in a number of Country Level Frameworks (including Humanitarian and Strategic Development Plans). Even though these are not always funding instruments as such, their value as identifying resourcing needs and establishing common assessment, strategic coherence and M&E frameworks across the HDP-N is considerable.

A number of respondents reported that some of the most successful programs they have worked with have relied on inputs from multiple sources, for example, core funding, bilateral funds and humanitarian appeals. They argued that multiple sources enabled them to ensure ongoing programming across humanitarian-development-peace divides. This may or may not be true for all contexts, but perhaps reflects the reality that at field level those implementing programs have found that the best way to manage risk and shortfalls in funding is to ensure that they have a number of potential funding streams available in order to “not keep all their eggs in one basket.”

Key findings and recommendations can be found in [Section 3.3](#).

Local/national-level resourcing

It is also of vital importance that from the outset a long-term view is adopted to ensure sustainability and to include the involvement of local authorities and structures in financing and resource allocation processes. While in some situations this may initially be very limited, it is an important principle to establish when considering long-term sustainability and local/national ownership. In the absence of the national Government, it may include work with local Governments or authorities in some instances.

Key findings and recommendations can be found in [Section 3.4](#).

Local ownership and supporting innovation

In [Section 2.6](#), the importance of finding ways to promote and support innovation for funding mechanisms was highlighted. This remains a challenge that needs to be considered and addressed if real steps forward are to be realized. In many environments, innovation and greater engagement with local communities is needed not just because it is appropriate but because it is the only way of potentially delivering support given challenges with access and local acceptance. One respondent noted that up to 75 percent of the membership of protection cluster mechanisms in many current emergencies often consists of local groups. At the same time, local groups often struggle to obtain support and financing (beyond basic grant compliance training) or to be properly involved in the design and planning of interventions.

“Given the challenges we face it really is time to get serious about financing local groups and not just treat them as sub-contractors.”
—Protection Specialist

In addition to the above, it can also be argued that traditional approaches to funding can also sometimes be inappropriate in certain situations and as a result not meet institutional or wider needs. In response to this it is recognized that new approaches and innovation may be required and could offer opportunities to support child reintegration or that are more appropriate ways to work with and support local groups. However, in addition to any challenges with potential instruments, equipping current organizations with an ability to support different financial instruments may also present challenges given the generally limited appetite for carrying fiduciary risk and

procedural and compliance issues. This has led to calls for more systematic inclusion of local groups in design and decision-making processes as well as for the development of financing instruments which offer easier access to flexible funding for a broader range of actors.

Key findings and recommendations can be found in [Section 3.5](#).

Coordination and coherence

As has been emphasized in sections throughout this document that an overarching requirement is for interventions to be informed by and adhere to clear and shared principles. Coordinated action is required across a range of services and sectors including health, education and training, and support for livelihoods. This is needed over a protracted period of time across the HDP-N and in a way that increasingly builds and strengthens the role and ownership of local actors and authorities.

At an institutional level, it is important to ensure that there is the right balance of incentives and sanctions to promote good practice and commitment to joined up working. Funding instruments have a major role to play in promoting effective coordination, policy coherence and adherence to good practice, or in undermining the best of policy statements or intentions if they are not aligned with and supportive of them. Done the right way, this has enormous potential to assist child reintegration efforts.

Key findings and recommendations can be found in [Section 3.6](#).



3. Options

3.1 Understanding contexts

Key finding 1: Interventions and programs must be informed by a clear and thorough assessment that takes into account conflict dynamics and the wider political economy. If they are to result in success these processes must be multi-sectoral in nature and cover the HDP-N as a whole. It is also important that they proactively seek to engage with and include communities in a meaningful way and that they carefully consider and analyze risks, including those that might result from the intervention itself and the type of finding instrument used.

Recommendation 1: Before final decisions are taken on the quantity and type of funding to be used a critical assessment must be made of the impact of the choice of instrument on the context and typology in which the intervention will be implemented. Issues related to the choice of intervention and partnerships go beyond financing instruments those providing financial support can play a major part in helping ensure that this takes place and that the financial modalities used are themselves fit for purpose.

3.2 Levels of funding

Key Finding 2: Tracking actual levels of expenditure is extremely difficult in practice. Despite the presence of specific funding codes at OECD/DAC level, these do not always capture or describe the full extent or scope of activities. This is particularly the case given the increasing use of pooled or unearmarked funding and where local or national budgets are used.

Recommendation 2: A more detailed analysis of 1-2 priority countries may help to get a more complete picture of the scale of overall funding deficits and to map out more clearly the challenges associated with transition of support across and between the HDP-N and conflict typologies.

Recommendation 3: Global Coalition members may wish to host a discussion on this issue to identify which organization/s might be best placed to engage in dialogue with the OECD/DAC and others. The aim would be to see if further work is required to more closely track reintegration activities and expenditures without creating procedures which are too cumbersome or duplicative. Given their overall interest and mandate on reintegration as a whole, the Interagency Working Group on DDR should also be involved.

Key finding 3: While there are overall deficits in resourcing these activities, not only the volume of resources must be considered, but also bridging gaps across the HDP-N and the predictability of funds to support child reintegration, given project and funding cycles. In some situations, the wrong choice of funding instruments, not just monetary shortfalls, may create problems if they give rise to undesirable incentives or tension between groups.

Recommendation 4: Evidence that the impact of exposure to violence on child health, well-being, relationships and social interactions is acute, and the case for intervention is therefore paramount. However, there exists limited longitudinal evidence on what type of interventions are most effective in the long term. Establishing a research or Learning Agenda is likely to be of interest and importance on a range of issues related to all three briefing papers of the Global Coalition.

3.3 Strategic-level funding instruments

Key finding 4: Given the evidence of their potential to increase effectiveness and promote alignment among stakeholders, pooled funds are of growing importance. In terms of support for child reintegration in particular, if it can be more effectively brought onto the agenda and priorities of these instruments, it has the added advantage of building coherence and cooperation across the HDP-N at both global and national levels. Finding an appropriate response to the need to increase the volume and interconnectedness of support to child reintegration programs across the HDP-N is likely to require a mix of approaches as one size will certainly not fit all. Establishing and maintaining strategic coherence will be important.

Recommendation 5: Further detailed design and costing work may be considered in relation to the potential options described below.

- **The development of a Global Multi Country Child Reintegration Pooled Fund.** This could have a common framework and indicators like an HRP with specific country analysis anchored in country level frameworks and with defined objectives, approaches, and funding requirements. Options for funding to be available over a minimum three-year period could be explored to make resourcing more predictable and sustained.
 - **Pros:** Dedicated funding instrument to use for resource generation; could offer opportunities for multi-year funding, helping to bridge funding deficits and meet immediate needs.
 - **Cons:** It could be difficult to maintain coherence with wider strategic frameworks at the country level and build effective cross sectoral coordination and national ownership. There may be reluctance to see the emergence of another centralized “single issue” funding instrument of this type.
- **Dialogue with the PBF/PBSO on whether opportunities exist for increasing support for child reintegration under one of more of their existing Priority Areas.** This would have the benefit of increasing attention and funding opportunities while promoting strategic and program coherence.
 - **Pros:** Existing mechanism well known by donors and with examples of use for child reintegration so start-up and scale-up costs likely to be limited. Instrument promotes coherence across the HDP-N and demonstrated track record in promoting inter-agency working.
 - **Cons:** Scope for attracting significant additional funding needs further analysis and extent to which NGOs and local partners

can access funds also requires further consideration.

- **As the new potential World Bank funding for reintegration (GPRS) is developed options for this also making available resources for child reintegration should also be considered.**
 - **Pros:** Potentially working in tandem with the PBS both may be able to leverage slightly different resources and support from different partners so potential for significant synergy to be created. Lessons learned could be shared between elements of the GPRS.
 - **Cons:** Maintaining coordination and coherence across and between different instruments will need careful consideration and ongoing efforts.

3.4 Local/national-level resourcing

It is also of vital importance that from the outset a long-term view is taken towards issues of sustainability and the involvement of local authorities and structures in financing and resource allocation processes. While in some situations this may initially be very limited, it is an important principle to establish when considering long-term sustainability and local/national ownership. In the absence of the national Government, it may include work with local Governments or authorities in some instances.

Key finding 5: Failure to properly consider local/national structures and systems (e.g. health services), particularly at sector level, are likely to make the creation of sustainable services much more challenging. In some situations, there may be a strong justification for structures to support individuals and groups for which it was not originally intended, but it is important that this is understood and explicitly documented with clear exit strategies established.

Recommendation 6: Carefully consider the implications (financially and otherwise) of services and structures at all stages in the design and implementation process, with efforts made to merge services, where appropriate, into long-term plans and processes owned by national authorities. The sooner this begins, however nascent, the better. Early contributions from national Governments, however small, can be important signals of political commitment.

3.5 Local ownership and supporting innovation

Key finding 6: There is an increasing number of alternative mechanisms and approaches for providing support, particularly to and through local stakeholders. In the research so far, while they may exist, no specific examples of their use to support child reintegration has been found. However, there is both interest in and scope for the further development and piloting of these types of instruments and programs. At the same time, it is important to recognize the practical challenges associated with doing this within existing administrative structures and procedures.

Recommendation 7: The possibility of bringing together a group of private sector and public organizations (i.e. UN, NGOs, donors) and those with specific expertise in this area to develop and pilot alternative funding initiatives. Ideas might include the piloting of a challenge-fund-type approach to support child reintegration interventions or even the use of a Development/Humanitarian Bond to support training or SMEs for example.

3.6 Coordination and coherence

Key finding 7: Work undertaken to promote common analysis, joint objectives, measurable indicators and monitoring frameworks is a feature

of some of the approaches to working in complex environments examined during this study. These are positive signs. It is also encouraging to note that in some of the recent country and strategic frameworks, real efforts were made to conduct detailed joint analysis and establish agreed objectives and monitoring frameworks. Finding ways to ensure that child reintegration is properly taken into account and included in these will be important now and in future.

Recommendation 8: It is recommended to conduct a clear and broad analysis of the situation and role of the interventions needed for child

reintegration to be effective. It must be clearly built into approval and appraisal procedures to ensure that interventions are underpinned by this analysis, and to determine where they fit within wider strategic frameworks and plans across the HDP-N. Notwithstanding, and taking into account conflict sensitivities, they should also be required to clearly demonstrate how and to what extent local authorities, communities and children themselves have been involved in assessment and design processes.



Annex A. Glossary

Assessed contributions: Obligatory payments made by member states to finance the UN regular budget and peacekeeping operations. Assessed contributions to the Regular Budget from member states are largely based on per capita income, with a floor of 0.001 percent to ensure that even the poorest countries contribute something.

Core funds/resources: In this paper the term is used to describe *unearmarked*, voluntary contributions to the regular budgets of UN agencies.

Delivery mechanism (financial): A service or platform that allows users to carry out various financial transactions such as cash withdrawal, payments, transfers, etc.

Earmarked resources: Funds that are earmarked (usually by the donor) to be used in specific countries, in specific projects or activities or to a specific theme or sub-program.

Financing mechanism: Method or source through which funding is made available and this and the term **financial instrument or financial modality** are often used interchangeably as overall “umbrella terms” for a range of different financial programs which may include grants, loans and Investments (OECD 2018).

General budget support: Defined by the OECD-DAC as “a method of financing a partner country’s budget through a transfer of resources from an external financing agency to the partner government’s national treasury. The funds thus transferred are managed in accordance with the recipient’s budgetary procedures.”

Official development assistance: Those resources provided to countries and territories on the DAC List of ODA Recipients and to multilateral development institutions which are: (i) provided by official agencies, including state and local governments, or by their executive agencies; and, (ii) each transaction of which is administered with the promotion of the economic development and welfare of developing countries as its main objective, and is concessional in character.

Pooled funds (UN): UN inter-agency pooled funds are a financing mechanism that provides the UN system with more flexible and predictable earmarked funding for jointly agreed UN priority programs in areas such as development, transition/peacebuilding, and humanitarian interventions.

SWAps: A type of program approach for which funding for a sector—whether internal or from donors—supports a single policy and expenditure program under government leadership and

adopts approaches across a sector. It is generally accompanied by efforts to strengthen government procedures for disbursement and accountability.

Voluntary contributions (UN): These are left to the discretion of each member state. These funds are also called “extra-budgetary” or “XB” resources.

These contributions, which account for more than half of total funding, finance most of the United Nations’ humanitarian relief and development activities—will include contributions to projects as well as any other types of additional support e.g. humanitarian appeals or thematic, etc.

Annex B. Summary of Issues in 2019 CAAC Annual Report

| Ref | Country | Summary of 2019 Issues (Focused on Recruitment) |
|--|--------------------------|--|
| A: Situations on the Agenda of the Security Council | | |
| A1 | Afghanistan | <p>The United Nations verified the recruitment and use of 45 boys and 1 girl, with some of the children recruited as young as 8, who were used for combat, at checkpoints, to plant improvised explosive devices, to carry out suicide attacks or other violations, or for sexual exploitation. At least 22 boys were killed during their association. Of those violations, 67 percent of the instances of recruitment and use were attributed to armed groups (31), including Tehrik-e Taliban Pakistan (17 boys in one incident), Taliban (11), Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant-Khorasan Province (ISIL-KP) (2) and an unidentified armed group (1). On 14 March, in Dehe Bala District, Nangarhar Province, ISIL-KP used two boys to publicly execute three men accused of being associated with the Afghan National Defence and Security Forces. The 15 remaining children were recruited and used by Afghan local police (6), Afghan National Police (1) and pro-government militias (8).</p> <p>Significant reduction in the recruitment and use of children by the Afghan Security Forces and SG commends the measures taken by the Government to better protect children affected by armed conflict, including through the child protection units in the Afghan National Police recruitment centers. It notes continued recruitment and use of children by armed groups, for combat roles, as well as about attacks that affect access to education and health.</p> |
| A2 | Central African Republic | <p>Government commended for fighting against impunity. Two anti-balaka leaders were arrested and transferred to the International Criminal Court for crimes including the recruitment and use of children under 15 years of age.</p> <p>Government to adopt a protocol for the handover of children associated with armed groups to child protection actors, to adopt the draft child protection code criminalizing the recruitment and use of children, to pass a decree protecting associated children from prosecution, and to consider a national prevention plan, in accordance with Security Council resolution 2427 (2018). In addition, 216 self- demobilized children were identified in Paoua (Ouham-Pendé Prefecture) and benefited from reintegration support from UNICEF. As part of the national disarmament, demobilization and reintegration program initiated at the end of 2018 in Paoua, 389 children were confirmed to have been associated with both factions of Révolution et justice (RJ). However, UNICEF and partners faced challenges in implementing reintegration programs owing to a lack of funds and the volatile environment.</p> |

| Ref | Country | Summary of 2019 Issues (Focused on Recruitment) |
|-----|----------------------------------|--|
| A3 | Colombia | <p>According to the Government, by 31 December 2018, more than 1 million people from Bolivia and the Republic of Venezuela had entered Colombia. Refugee and migrant children are at risk of recruitment and sexual violence. 120 incidents of recruitment and use, which affected 293 children, some as young as 14, were verified, a sharp increase compared with 169 children in 2017. Dissident FARC-EP groups⁴ were the main perpetrators (82 children) followed by the ELN (69) and Autodefensas Gaitanistas de Colombia (AGC) also known as Clan del Golfo (12).</p> <p>In August 2018, Decree 1434 was issued, adopting public policy guidance on the prevention of recruitment and use of children and of sexual violence against children by non-State armed groups and was encouraged the Government to strengthen institutions and programs to prevent recruitment and use. Concerns raised about the high number of instances of the recruitment and use of children by dissident FARC-EP groups and use of children by ELN and by the increase in the killing and maiming of children by armed groups.</p> <p>SG concerned about those children included in the program “Camino diferencial de vida” who have not yet received reparations, and about the lack of adequate resources for the program. Urged the Government to implement a reintegration process for newly identified children, who have been released through informal processes, and to reinforce security guarantees for program participants.</p> |
| A4 | Democratic Republic of the Congo | <p>A total of 631 children (91 girls, 540 boys) were recruited in 2018. Mai-Mai Mazembe (170) and Nyatura (150) accounted for half of the new recruitments, followed by other armed groups. North Kivu remained the epicenter of child recruitment and use, with more than 70 percent of all cases, followed by the Greater Kasai region (16 percent) and South Kivu (10 percent).</p> <p>Children were mostly abducted for the purpose of recruitment (209), of these 62 were subjected to sexual violence. Continuous screening to determine the age of children during FARDC and PNC recruitment campaigns, as a result of which 146 children were separated before their enrollment.</p> <p>The United Nations increased its efforts to encourage armed groups to cease grave violations. 8 armed group commanders signed a declaration committing to end and prevent child recruitment.</p> <p>The United Nations supported the implementation of the 2009 Child Protection Act, punishing child recruitment by up to 10 years’ imprisonment, including through support to military justice, lawyers and non-governmental organizations. For the first time, two armed groups commanders were sentenced to life in prison for charges including child recruitment. The trial of Ntabo Ntaberi Sheka, former commander of Nduma défense du Congo-Sheka, and two of his commanders, on charges of war crimes, including child recruitment and use, and sexual violence, started in November 2018. Child victims and witnesses were identified, with support from the United Nations for those efforts.</p> <p>DRC Government commended for sustaining the gains of its action plan on child recruitment and use. Government encouraged to ensure that protection and screening measures are in place to identify and separate children and ensure their access to reintegration services.</p> |

| Ref | Country | Summary of 2019 Issues (Focused on Recruitment) |
|-----|-------------------------------|--|
| A5 | Iraq | <p>The United Nations verified the recruitment and use of 39 children by parties to conflict, including five boys between the ages of 12 and 15, used by the Iraqi Federal Police in Ninawa Governorate to fortify a checkpoint, and one 15-year-old boy used by ISIL in Anbar Governorate to drive a car bomb into Fallujah city. In addition, 33 Yazidi boys between the ages of 15 and 17 were rescued after being abducted in Iraq in 2014 by ISIL and trained and deployed to fight.</p> <p>There are ongoing discussions with the Government of Iraq on developing an action plan to prevent child recruitment and use by PMF and encourage its forces' screening.</p> <p>Welcomed the release of 40 boys by tribal armed groups, with the support of the United Nations, which assisted in their reintegration and reiterated the willingness of the United Nations to support the Government in prioritizing the reintegration of children formerly associated with parties to conflict.</p> |
| A6 | Israel and State of Palestine | <p>The United Nations verified the recruitment and use of three 17-year-old boys in Gaza (two) and the West Bank (one) by the Palestinian Islamic Jihad's al-Quds Brigades, Hamas' al-Qassam Brigades and an unidentified Palestinian armed group (one each). The United Nations received testimony from three children, between the ages of 15 and 16, that Israeli forces attempted to recruit them as informants.</p> <p>Israel Government called upon to uphold international juvenile justice standards, as well as to cease the use of administrative detention for children and use of detained children as informants and end all forms of ill-treatment in detention. Palestinian actors advised to refrain from encouraging children's participation in violence. Group like al-Quds and al-Qassam Brigades called to immediately cease the recruitment and use of children.</p> |
| A7 | Lebanon | <p>The recruitment and use of children by armed groups continued, with 22 children (21 boys, 1 girl) verified as associated with the Ansarullah Movement (Ansar Allah) (5), Hezbollah (1) or unidentified militia (16). They were mostly used as guards or in support roles, for carrying weapons or food.</p> <p>SG expressed concern about armed clashes in camps for Palestinian refugees and about the recruitment and use of children, through attacks on schools and the impact thereof on children's well-being and access to education. A call to Government to ratify the Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on the involvement of children in armed conflict. Children associated with armed groups should be treated primarily as victims, detained only as a last resort and for the shortest possible period of time, and be promptly referred to reintegration programs.</p> |
| A8 | Libya | <p>The United Nations received reports of the increased recruitment and use of children, yet information could not be verified owing to security and access restrictions. Encouraged the collaboration between the United Nations and local authorities in the area of Zintan on the reintegration of children and the engagement with armed groups to end and prevent the recruitment and use of children.</p> <p>SG Welcomes the collaboration between the United Nations and local authorities in the area of Zintan on the reintegration of children and the engagement with armed groups to end and prevent the recruitment and use of children.</p> |

| Ref | Country | Summary of 2019 Issues (Focused on Recruitment) |
|-----|---------|--|
| A9 | Mali | <p>The United Nations verified the recruitment and use of 109 boys and 5 girls. The main perpetrators were Platform (57) (including the Groupe d'autodéfense des Touaregs Imghad et leurs alliés (GATIA) (27), Ganda Lassale Izo (24) and other Platform members (6)), and the Coordination des mouvements de l'Azawad (CMA) (23) (including the Mouvement national pour la libération de l'Azawad (MNLA) (12), the Haut Conseil pour l'unité de l'Azawad (9) and other CMA members (2)). At least 31 children were used as combatants, 3 of whom were children between the ages of 14 and 17 who were associated with Congrès pour la justice dans l'Azawad and were killed by CMA at a checkpoint in Timbuktu region.</p> <p>A joint United Nations-CMA-Government coordination mechanism was established for the implementation of the 2017 action plan. In 2018, 102 boys and 5 girls formerly associated with armed groups received reintegration support from UNICEF and partners. However, the implementation has been slow, major concern was the continued recruitment and use of children.</p> <p>In the framework of the accelerated disarmament, demobilization and reintegration and integration process in Gao, Kidal and Timbuktu, nine individuals who were presumed to be children, were identified during the screening of combatants but were not released, as they presented adult identity cards, which had been issued a few days prior to the screening.</p> |
| A10 | Myanmar | <p>The United Nations verified 7 children having been recruited and 64 children having been used by the Tatmadaw in 2018. In addition, the past recruitment of 26 boys by the Tatmadaw was verified in 2018. The United Nations verified 11 incidents of the recruitment and use of 17 children (14 boys and 3 girls) by armed groups. Nine incidents were attributed to the Kachin Independence Army (KIA), one to Ta'ang National Liberation Army (TNLA) and one to Karen National Liberation Army. In addition, two incidents were documented involving United Wa State Army (UWSA). There is still a concern about the ongoing recruitment and use of children and detention of children by the Government.</p> <p>United Nations encouraged to further engage stakeholders in adopting concrete commitments, and to take action to prevent and address the recruitment of children with immediate effect. Myanmar Government needs to accelerate implementation of the joint action plan on ending and preventing the recruitment and use of children. Though efforts are under way, full compliance is yet to be achieved and aggravated cases of new recruitment occurred in 2018, with no progress on accountability. However, 75 children and young people recruited as children were released from the Tatmadaw in 2018 and there has been steady progress in addressing the backlog of cases from previous cases. However, the levels of recruitment and use, and of the killing and maiming of children and the resulting violations remain a concern.</p> |

| Ref | Country | Summary of 2019 Issues (Focused on Recruitment) |
|-----|-------------|--|
| A11 | Somalia | <p>A total of 2,228 boys and 72 girls, some as young as 8, were recruited and used by parties to conflict. The recruitment of children by Al-Shabaab significantly increased (1,865) compared with 2017 as the group sustained its recruitment drive, including by forcing clan elders and parents to provide children or face reprisal. Other perpetrators included the Somali National Army (155), Somali police (93), Galmudug forces (67), Jubbaland forces (56), clan militias (24), Puntland forces (20) and Ahl al-Sunna wal-Jama'a (ASWJ) (14). A total of 1,609 children (1,479 boys, 130 girls), some as young as 8, were verified as abducted, 97 percent of them by Al-Shabaab (1,590) mainly for the purpose of recruitment and use. On 13 October, three boys between the ages of 11 and 16 were abducted by Al-Shabaab from a local madrasa in Howlwadaag village, Bu'aale district, Juba Dhexe Region. The children were taken to a training facility for indoctrination and subsequent recruitment.</p> <p>This increase in the recruitment and use by Al-Shabaab, is a major concern, and United Nations has strongly encouraged parties to end and prevent violations.</p> <p>In 2018, 74 children were released from the Puntland forces, 17 of whom were earmarked for integration into the Somali National Army, the Somali National Army rescued 36 boys, some as young as 7, from an Al-Shabaab training center in Shabelle Hoose Region. All children were handed over to UNICEF and partners for reintegration support. Overall, 1,179 children formerly associated with armed forces and groups received reintegration support in 2018.</p> <p>SG is concerned over the detention of children for their alleged association with Al-Shabaab and call on authorities to treat these children primarily as victims, to prioritize their reintegration in line with their best interests, and to respect due process and international juvenile justice standards.</p> |
| A12 | South Sudan | <p>The United Nations verified 102 incidents of recruitment or use affecting 453 children (365 boys, 88 girls), 14 percent of whom were under 15 years of age at the time of their recruitment. Almost half of the cases were attributed to the South Sudan National Liberation Movement (SSNLM) (224 children), followed by the pro-Machar Sudan People's Liberation Army-in-Opposition (SPLA-IO) (84) and the National Salvation Front (NAS) (2), with some cases relating to children who had been recruited in previous years. Close to 30 percent of the children were recruited and used by Government Security Forces (143), including the South Sudan People's Defence Forces (SSPDF) (94), Taban Deng-allied SSPDF (46), the South Sudan. 109 children (49 boys, 51 girls, 9 sex unknown) were verified as having been abducted. The pro-Machar SPLA-IO was responsible for a large majority of those cases (92), often for the purpose of rape and other forms of sexual violence and for the recruitment and use of children. SSPDF was responsible for the abduction of 17 children. Within the framework of the existing action plan to end and prevent child recruitment and use, signed in 2012 and recommitted to in 2014, the SSPDF appointed child protection focal points across its divisions, organized trainings on child protection jointly with the United Nations and granted access for the United Nations to conduct screenings in Bentiu military barracks.</p> <p>In addition, the SRSG expressed extreme concerned about the increase in abductions, often for the purpose of sexual violence and recruitment, and urge the pro-Machar SPLA-IO faction to engage with the United Nations on the action plan to end and prevent the recruitment and use of children and the killing and maiming of children signed in 2016.</p> |

| Ref | Country | Summary of 2019 Issues (Focused on Recruitment) |
|-----|----------------------|--|
| A13 | Sudan | <p>No cases of the recruitment and use of children were verified in 2018, although allegations thereof were received. After the removal of the President of the Sudan and his Government, in April 2019 efforts were made to sustain the gains of the action plan to end and prevent child recruitment and use, which was completed in 2018. There is continued collaboration between the Government and the United Nations in the training of security forces, local authorities, community members and community-based child protection networks on child protection and child rights, in particular at the state level, and I encourage these areas of collaboration to be further reinforced in all parts of Darfur. Authorities were encouraged to operationalize the complaint mechanism manual for reporting child recruitment.</p> <p>The United Nations calls on the SPLM/N to allow them access to verify the implementation of its 2016 action plan on ending and preventing the recruitment and use of children.</p> |
| A14 | Syrian Arab Republic | <p>The United Nations verified the recruitment and use of 806 children (670 boys, 136 girls), 22 percent of whom were under 15 years of age (179), and 94 percent of whom were used in combat roles (754). and forced marriage (12). One in five children abducted was subjected to ill-treatment, torture, rape or execution.</p> <p>Recognizes the United Nations dialogue with the Government on child protection, including on the reintegration of children. Noted a significant reduction in the recruitment and use of children in 2018, though further preventive actions are needed.</p> <p>Recognizes the engagement of SDF, including YPG/YPJ, with the UN leading to the development and adoption of an action plan to end and prevent the recruitment and use of children in 2019. Noted further the engagement by groups self-affiliated with FSA, and by Ahrar al-Sham and Army of Islam, as regards training, and commitments to child protection. Encouraged by the issuance of a military order by Army of Islam setting 18 as the minimum age of recruitment.</p> <p>Recognizes the United Nations dialogue with the Government on child protection, including on the reintegration of children and calls upon all parties to the conflict to enhance engagement with the United Nations to develop standard operating procedures on the release and reintegration of children associated with parties.</p> |
| A15 | Yemen | <p>The United Nations verified the recruitment and use of 370 children, attributed to Houthis (170), Yemeni Government forces (111), Security Belt Forces (44), Shabwani Elite Forces (23), Popular Resistance (17), Hadrami Elite Forces (4) and forces loyal to the Southern Transitional Council (1). The decrease compared with 2017 (842) is mainly a result of access and security restrictions and the fear experienced by communities.</p> <p>United Nations verified the recruitment of 16 girls between the ages of 15 and 17 by the Houthis in Sa'dah, used to encourage male members of their families to join the Houthis and to mobilize other women and girls to do the same. Some were also trained in the use of weapons. Boys were recruited and used as combatants and in various support roles, including as porters, guards, for patrolling and to assist in intelligence gathering. A road map was endorsed by the Government in December 2018 to expedite the implementation of the action plan to end and prevent recruitment and use of children of 2014. Strongly condemns violations against children committed by armed groups.</p> |

| Ref | Country | Summary of 2019 Issues (Focused on Recruitment) |
|----------------------------|---------|--|
| B: Other situations | | |
| B1 | Nigeria | <p>The Boko Haram crisis was marked by attacks across the Lake Chad Basin and by increased attacks on hospitals in north-east Nigeria. The abduction of children, in particular girls, often for the purpose of sexual abuse, forced marriage or used to bear improvised explosive devices continued at elevated levels. In 2018, the United Nations faced significant access restrictions to conflict-affected areas, impeding its ability to verify grave violations and to deliver life-saving aid.</p> <p>A total of 1,947 children (1,596 boys, 351 girls) were verified as having been recruited and used in Nigeria, 1,646 by the Civilian Joint Task Force (CJTF) and 301 by Boko Haram. No new recruitment and use by CJTF was verified in 2018 and all cases verified occurred in previous years. 833 children (694 boys, 139 girls) were formally separated from the group during 2018 as a result of the action plan. Boko Haram continued to recruit children and used 48 (38 girls) for the purpose of bearing and detonating improvised explosive devices in north-east Nigeria, 30 in Cameroon, 24 in Chad and 10 in the Niger. The United Nations continued engagement with CJTF within the framework of the action plan to end and prevent child recruitment and use, signed in September 2017, and 833 children were formally separated from CJTF in 2018. I welcome this development and call on CJTF to continue the implementation of the plan with the United Nations. Recognizes the Government in support of this process and of the reintegration of released children.</p> <p>Commends the Nigerian authorities of 241 children from detention but, still concerned about children remaining in detention owing to their alleged association with Boko Haram and calls on the authorities to release all children, ensure their sustainable reintegration, swiftly adopt a handover protocol for children associated with armed groups to civilian child protection actors, in line with international standards, and provide access to the United Nations to all children deprived of liberty.</p> |



Annex C. Methods Used for Data Collection

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|----------------------------|--|
| Literature review | <ul style="list-style-type: none">● A structured and targeted literature review has been carried out, aimed at identifying and reviewing key documents based on the core topics and issues identified in the study objectives.● A simple electronic repository of documents has been established which includes the grouping of documents by subject, author, etc., and contains a brief summary/synopsis of each entry. The Repository will be available as an addendum (in the form of an electronic folder) to the final report and contains over 60 documents.● A summary list of documents contained within it can be found at Annex B. |
| Stakeholder mapping | <p>A basic stakeholder mapping was conducted and used to inform both the primary data gathering and literature reviews but also the main report itself. An initial broad grouping/typology of institutions was identified and has been refined during the course of the review.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none">● Multilateral institutions: UN agencies /entities involved either directly or indirectly in financial and/or technical support to programs—including those with specific mandates (e.g. UNICEF).● Bilateral donors:<ul style="list-style-type: none">— UN Member states financing programs through various channels and mechanisms.— UN Member states (those implementing reintegration).— May include those with active and/or historic caseloads and activities.● Non-governmental organizations:<ul style="list-style-type: none">— NGOs (particularly but not limited to Global Coalition members) who are involved in child reintegration.— Focus will be on service delivery but will also include those engaged at policy and advocacy levels.● Private sector entities: Groups with experience / interest in supporting programs or groups—including philanthropic funds and organizations supporting / working with such groups.● Academia: Institutions or groups with a specific research or learning focus. |

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| Primary data gathering from key respondents | <ul style="list-style-type: none">● A series of interviews (mainly through Skype/telephone) has been held with key informants drawn from a cross-section of respondents from the groups above. Attempts were made to engage with key informants working at both service delivery but also policy and planning levels (including those with responsibility for the design of financial instruments and procedures, etc.).● Interviews have been carried out using a Topic Guide drawn from the core topics/issues highlighted in the description of the study objectives (see Section 1.2).● A copy of the Topic Guide can be found at Annex C. |
| Validation | Validation through peer review processes including presentations to select target audiences with feedback incorporated. |

Endnotes

1. Stakeholders consulted ranged from former child soldiers and other survivors of armed conflict, Member States, UN agencies, NGOs and academia, to independent experts and the private sector.
2. They can be found at <https://childrenandarmedconflict.un.org/global-coalition-for-reintegration-of-child-soldiers/>.
3. [Global Coalition for Reintegration of Former Child Soldiers](#).
4. In this instance packages refers to the suite of (usually) relatively short-term interventions that may encompass family tracing, alternative care, re-enrollment in school, catch-up education, vocational training and psychosocial support.
5. Organized to help mark the tenth anniversary of the Paris Commitments and Principles on CAAC.
6. [The UN's new "Sustaining Peace" Agenda: A Policy Breakthrough in the Making](#), Stimson Center, 2018.
7. Although support from peacekeeping budgets is not used for reintegration as a general rule it may sometimes be used to provide immediate care and support following release and in certain instances for initiatives such as Community Violence Reduction—for example this was the case in Haiti.
8. Examples include Afghanistan, Nigeria, Uganda and Colombia.
9. These emphasize the importance of processes being voluntary, people-centered, gender responsive and inclusive, conflict-sensitive, context specific, flexible accountable and transparent, nationally and locally owned, regionally supported, integrated and well planned.
10. Official Development Assistance flows are defined as those flows to countries and territories on the DAC List of ODA Recipients and to multilateral development institutions which are: (i) provided by official agencies, including state and local governments, or by their executive agencies; and (ii) each transaction of which, is administered with the promotion of the economic development and welfare of developing countries as its main objective; and is concessional in character.
11. Source OECD/DA PPS.
12. For the purpose of this paper "Primary Channel" means the direct recipient of resources—the direct recipient often then provides support through partners/implementers to others.
13. [Closing the Funding Gap for the Reintegration of Children Associated with Armed Forces and Groups](#), War Child, 2018.
14. For example such as that provided by the [Korean International Cooperation Agency for BTVET](#) under its support to education.
15. In terms of countries of interest in the 2019 SG Report on Children in Armed Conflict this includes: CAR, Colombia, DRC, Libya, Mali, Myanmar, Somalia, Sudan, South Sudan, Yemen.
16. OECD statistics.
17. [Tracking Spending on the SDGs: What Have we Learned from the MDGs?](#) IBP, 2017.
18. OECD DAC 2016.
19. For more analysis and exploration of this topic see [Innovative Finance to Sustain Peace: Mapping Ideas](#), Riva Kantowitz, NYC, 2019.
20. Kantowitz, R. (2019). *Funding Local Actors: Radically Flexible Tools*. Peace Direct. Advance on-line publication.
21. This includes in its targeting vulnerable and unemployed youth—which in this context could be an important component of strategies to prevent (re-)recruitment into armed groups.
22. [Effects of armed conflict on child health and development: A systematic Review](#), Kadir A, Shenada S, Goldhagen J, PLoS ONE, 2019.
23. [The Gender Dimensions of Violence in Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration](#), IAWG on DDR, 2012.

The Global Coalition for Reintegration of Child Soldiers (GCR) is an alliance of Member States, United Nations entities, the World Bank, non-governmental organizations and academia—launched in 2018 to advance global efforts to address reintegration of former child soldiers, and prompt action to increase children’s access to sustainable, long-term support.

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